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Abstract
The challenges of increased temperatures, drier fuels and more intense wildfires are having a 
detrimental effect on Alaskans, especially those who live in the wildland urban interface. This area is 
defined by open wildlands being directly adjacent to homeowners. Human safety and property are 
exposed to increasing risk from these wildfires as climate-based changes affect the state. The rising costs 
of suppressing wildfires necessitate exploring potential solutions to minimize the impact on the state 
population and budget. The purpose of this study is to analyze the feasibility of fuel treatments to reduce 
suppression costs and provide incentives to private homeowners to create safer property spaces. An 
electronic survey and choice experiment were administered to 388 Alaskan homeowners to measure 
willingness-to-pay for different attributes associated with wildfire risk reduction variables, including 
nearby fuel treatments and overall neighborhood participation. Expenditure data were collected for large 
Alaskan wildfires between 2007 and 2015. An econometric cost model was developed to estimate the 
effect of nearby fuel treatments on final wildfire suppression expenditures. In both scenarios, there was a 
limited effect from public land fuel treatments on homeowner preferences and total suppression costs. 
Homeowners had a strong preference for thinned fuel treatments but did not prefer clear-cut tracts of land, 
even when compared to doing nothing at all. The survey provided significant insight into the preferences 
of Alaskan homeowners, including altruistic behavior, free riding behavior, self-assessment of risk, and 
the amenity values of surrounding vegetation. The costs of large Alaskan wildfires in the data set was 
mainly driven by protection level and number of burn days, and not by the presence or potential 




Abstract ..........................................................................................................................................................  i
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ...............................................................................................................................................  v
List of Tables ...............................................................................................................................................  vi
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................  1
1.1 References........................................................................................................................................4
Chapter 2 Homeowner Preferences of Wildfire Risk Mitigation in the Alaskan Wildland Urban Interface
- Selected Survey Results............................................................................................................................. 7
Abstract.................................................................................................................................................  7
2.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................  7
2.2 Background ...................................................................................................................................  12
2.2.1 Risk Perception .....................................................................................................................  12
2.2.2 Insurance ...............................................................................................................................  12
2.2.3 Incentivizing Mitigation Actions ..........................................................................................  13
2.2.4 Method ..................................................................................................................................  14
2.3 Introduction to the Survey and Survey Results.............................................................................  15
2.3.1 Questions About Your Home and Property ..........................................................................  16
2.3.2 Activities You Take to Reduce Wildfire Risk - Land Management Agencies and You ...... 22
2.3.3 Neighbors and their Property - Survey Respondent Demographics....................................28
2.4 Discussion .....................................................................................................................................  32
2.4.1 Differences in Borough Responses .......................................................................................  32
2.4.2 Mitigation Actions and Defensible Space.............................................................................  32
2.4.3 Policy Implications ...............................................................................................................  34
2.4.4 Sources of Bias .....................................................................................................................  35
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................  35
2.6 References.....................................................................................................................................  37
Chapter 3 Homeowner Preferences of Wildfire Risk Mitigation in the Alaskan Wildland Urban Interface
- Choice Experiment Results ......................................................................................................................  39
Abstract...............................................................................................................................................  39
3.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................39
3.1.1 Alaskan Perspective on Wildfire...........................................................................................  40
3.1.2 Under Provision of Wildfire Risk Mitigation ........................................................................  44
3.1.3 Homeowner Participation in Mitigation Actions ...................................................................  45
iii
3.2 Method ..........................................................................................................................................  46
3.2.1 Random Utility Model ..........................................................................................................  46
3.2.2 Mixed Logit Model ...............................................................................................................  47
3.2.3 Hierarchical Bayes Estimation .............................................................................................  48
3.2.4 Choice Experiment Design ...................................................................................................  49
3.2.5 Sample Selection....................................................................................................................51
3.2.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Population Sample ...................................................................  52
3.3 Choice Experiment Results and Discussion..................................................................................  53
3.3.1 All Respondents ....................................................................................................................  53
3.3.2 Differences in Borough Respondents ...................................................................................  55
3.3.3 Self-Identification of Risk......................................................................................................56
3.3.4 Insurance ...............................................................................................................................  57
3.3.5 Previous Experience with Wildfire .......................................................................................  57
3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................  58
3.5 References......................................................................................................................................59
Chapter 4 The Effect of Fuel Treatments on the Suppression Costs of Large Alaskan Wildfires.............. 75
Abstract...............................................................................................................................................  75
4.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................75
4.1.1 Alaskan Perspective on Wildfire...........................................................................................  75
4.1.2 The Cost of Wildfire Suppression......................................................................................... 76
4.1.3 Wildfire Time Trends in Alaska ...........................................................................................  77
4.1.4 Are Fuel Treatments Effective? ............................................................................................  77
4.2 Data................................................................................................................................................78
4.2.1 State of Alaska Wildfire Suppression Data...........................................................................  78
4.2.2 Data Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................  79
4.3 Model ............................................................................................................................................  80
4.3.1 Endogeneity of Wildfire Costs.............................................................................................. 80
4.3.2 Instrumental Variables ..........................................................................................................  80
4.3.3 Structural Model ...................................................................................................................  82
4.4 Results............................................................................................................................................83
4.4.1 Endogenous and Instrumental Variables...............................................................................  83
4.4.2 Selected Model Results.........................................................................................................  84
4.5 Discussion .....................................................................................................................................  85
4.5.1 Model Estimators ..................................................................................................................  85
4.5.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables ..............................................................................  86
iv
4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................  87
4.7 References......................................................................................................................................89





Figure 2.1 Objective risk zones in the Fairbanks-North Star Borough .......................................................  10
Figure 2.2 Objective risk zones in the Kenai Peninsula Borough............................................................... 11
Figure 3.1 Total number of wildfires in Alaska from 2007 to 2015 ...........................................................  41
Figure 3.2 Objective risk zones in the Fairbanks-North Star Borough .......................................................  42
Figure 3.3 Objective risk zones in the Kenai Peninsula Borough............................................................... 43
Figure 4.1 Map of Alaskan suppression response zones.............................................................................  93
Figure 4.2 Total number and acres of all wildfires in the State of Alaska by year .....................................  93
Figure 4.3 Total number and acres of Alaska Department of Forestry wildfires by year...........................  94
Figure 4.4 Total real costs and acres burned per year.................................................................................  97
Figure 4.5 Total real costs per fire and acres burned per fire per year........................................................ 97
vi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Defensible space responses by borough and for all respondents in total .................................... 16
Table 2.2 Defensible space responses by risk zone and for all respondents in total...................................17
Table 2.3 Responses to home construction materials questions broken down by borough .......................  18
Table 2.4 Responses to home construction materials questions broken down by wildfire risk................. 19
Table 2.5 Subjective risk vs. objective risk by borough .............................................................................  20
Table 2.6 Risk perception vs. objective risk by borough ............................................................................  21
Table 2.7 Insurance vs. risk perception and objective risk .........................................................................  22
Table 2.8 Well insured vs. risk perception and objective risk ....................................................................  22
Table 2.9 Mitigation action vs. objective risk and borough........................................................................ 23
Table 2.10 Frequency counts of mitigation actions taken by objective wildfire risk zones ......................  24
Table 2.11 Frequency counts of mitigation actions taken by borough ......................................................  25
Table 2.12 Mitigation action p value testing by objective risk and borough .............................................  26
Table 2.13 Disincentives to taking risk reducing actions ...........................................................................  26
Table 2.14 Responses to question regarding fuel reduction preferences ....................................................  27
Table 2.15 Neighbor defensible space by borough .....................................................................................  28
Table 2.16 Own defensible space vs. neighbor defensible space by borough ...........................................  29
Table 2.17 Table of sample demographics of all survey respondents ........................................................  30
Table 2.18 Comparison of survey sociodemographic breakdown ..............................................................  31
Table 2.19 Household income by defensible space and mitigation action .................................................  32
Table 3.1 Variables and variable levels used in choice experiment............................................................62
Table 3.2 Age demographic data counts broken down by risk zone...........................................................  63
Table 3.3 Education demographic data counts broken down by risk zone .................................................  64
Table 3.4 Income demographic data counts broken down by risk zone .....................................................  65
Table 3.5 Responses to mitigation action taken broken down by risk zone ...............................................  66
Table 3.6 Counts of specific risk mitigation actions taken by homeowners...............................................  67
vii
Table 3.7 Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group preparedness scores by region ...............................  68
Table 3.8 Responses to defensible space question broken down by risk zone ...........................................  68
Table 3.9 Responses to fuel treatment question broken down by risk zone ...............................................  69
Table 3.10a WTP estimates for all respondents, subjective risk and insurance......................................... 70
Table 3.10b WTP estimates for all respondents and by changes in income ..............................................  71
Table 3.10c WTP estimates for all respondents, borough differences and experience with wildfire ........  72
Table 3.11 Frequency table of altruistic choice sets ...................................................................................  73
Table 3.12 Frequency table of free-riding choice sets ................................................................................  73
Table 4.1 Wildfire counts and acres burned from 1990-2018 by protection zone ...................................... 92
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and definitions for data set variables ........................................................  95
Table 4.3 Yearly breakdown of costs and acres burned in total and per fire .............................................  96
Table 4.4 Wildfire acreage and cost statistics by protection zone .............................................................  96
Table 4.5 Frequency table of wildfire cause by protection zone ................................................................  96
Table 4.6 Parameter estimates for two specified models ............................................................................ 98
Table 4.7 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all variables in both models..............................................  99
viii
Acknowledgements
This work would have been impossible for me to do alone. I would like to thank my committee 
chair and mentor Dr. Joe Little (Professor of Economics-UAF), who not only inspired me to continue my 
education, but helped me achieve my goals every single step of the way. I would like to thank my other 
committee members Dr. Stacy Drury (Research Fire Ecologist - USFS), Dr. Jungho Baek (Professor of 
Economics-UAF) and Dr. Joshua Greenberg (Associate Professor of Resource Economics-UAF) for 
continued feedback and suggestions to improve this presented work. Their words were always well 
received and supportive. Thank you to a previous committee member Dr. David Verbyla (Professor of 
GIS in Natural Resources) whose well deserved retirement forced an early exit from the committee. I 
would like to thank Dr. W. Burns Cooper (Professor of English - UAF) who kindly agreed to participate 
in my oral exam as an outside examiner and Dr. Nicole Moelders (Professor of Atmospheric Sciences - 
UAF) who graciously participated in my dissertation defense. I would like to thank the University of 
Alaska Fairbanks, specifically the School of Management and School of Natural Resources Extension for 
providing me with the two programs I had the pleasure to be a part of: The M.S. in Applied and Resource 
Economics, and the PhD in Natural Resources and Sustainability.
This work was made possible by funding from a Joint Fire Science Program grant (project 14-5­
01-27), the UAF Resiliency and Adaptation Program and UAF School of Management. I would also like 
to thank the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, the Alaska Fire Service, and the Alaska 
Interagency Coordination Center. Specifically, I would like to thank Marsha Henderson, Kathryn Pyne 
and Gabriella Branson for their assistance with data collection and compilation. I would like to thank the 
other contributors of the larger grant project, including Randi Jandt, Nathan Lojewski, Fabian Keirn, and 
William Putnam. Numerous graduate students helped during different portions of the work, including 
Brock Lane, Nathaniel Burke, Paul Reinker, Mack Wood, Jordan Hume, Michelle Ohnes and Barbara 
Johnson. I would also like to thank all the participants in this study, including survey respondents, 
workshop participants, those who offered comments during presentations and wildfire managers for 
allowing this work to be completed.
I would like to thank my wonderful wife Elizabeth whose support and dedication kept my internal 
flame resilient, even through the most trying of Fairbanks winters. I would like to thank my daughter 
Dahlia whose winter solstice birth while I was a PhD student increased both the challenge and joy present 
in my world. Finally, I would like to thank my Mom, whose kind spirit and enduring love for her 




The state of Alaska is currently facing an unprecedented budget crisis. Critical services are in 
jeopardy as the price of oil has significantly dropped since the second half of 2014. While the state 
mobilizes to address their immediate and essential needs, long term planning is required to minimize 
future budgetary challenges. One significant area of concern is funding for wildfire suppression. The state 
Department of Forestry is responsible for protecting life and property in state managed lands, as well as 
assist in that responsibility on federal lands. These lands are often adjacent to private homeowners, and 
these large communities are particularly vulnerable to catastrophic loss from an immense and 
uncontrollable wildfire. The probability of these wildfires occurring is increasing, as wildfires have been 
shown to be increasing in both frequency and severity in Alaskan boreal forests (Kasischke & Turetsky 
2006). Suppression costs are expected to be between one and two billion dollars over the next century and 
averaging $60 million per year (Melvin et al. 2017). While these numbers may seem reasonable for such a 
vital service, it represents a very large expenditure, and an even larger expense when viewed from a per 
capita perspective. Because of this, research must be done to examine potential budgetary efficiencies and 
look for avenues to respond to this potential expenditure increase.
One potentially effective method of reducing suppression costs are the use of fuel treatments 
(Saperstein et al. 2014). Fuel treatments are areas where large portions of flammable vegetative biomass 
are removed from strategic wildfire suppression locations. These fuel treatments can be costly and need 
consistent maintenance. However, even older fuel treatments can significantly mitigate wildfire behavior 
(Little et al. 2018). There are also different types of fuel treatments, each with different advantages and 
weaknesses. Thinned fuel treatments focus on reducing the bulk of the flammable fuels from the forest 
understory, leaving the tree structures mainly intact. These are much more expensive than clear cutting 
treatments and have the potential to cost upwards of $8,000 per acre in 2019 dollars (St. Clair 2006). 
From a budget standpoint, the costs associated with these fuel breaks need to at least equal the saved 
suppression costs from their use. Another effective method to address this issue is to examine community 
wide fuel reduction on private lands. Homeowner actions reduce community level wildfire risk and can 
lessen the pressure on land management agencies to protect vulnerable communities. It becomes 
necessary to understand the incentives and factors that determine the behavior of these homeowners that 
are especially susceptible to wildfire. Understanding the effectiveness of fuel treatments and homeowner 
incentives forms the basis of the presented work and is assessed over the next three chapters.
Chapter 2 and 3 analyze an electronic survey, but from very different perspectives. Chapter 2 
approaches the survey from a more traditional social science perspective and looks at multiple choice and 
1
multi-select questions to ascertain stated homeowner preferences. Land management agencies often place 
fuel treatments in locations for suppression strategy alone and sometimes fail to assess how this changes 
private homeowner behavior. Previous studies have shown that these fuel treatments create the illusion 
that homeowners are adequately protected from wildfire risk and acts as a disincentive to homeowners 
taking actions that decrease risk on their own property (Prante et al. 2011, Talberth et al. 2006). These 
private land actions can have significant impact to community level wildfire risk (Butry and Donovan 
2008) and is generally under provided in many Alaskan communities (Brenkert-Smith et al. 2006). 
Private homeowner risk mitigating activity should then be viewed similarly to fuel treatments in their 
effectiveness to reduce risk to homeowner property from wildfire. While it will not have the same 
budgetary impacts as public land fuel treatments, these changes could create more wildfire resilient 
communities and potentially share the burden of community wide wildfire risk reduction.
Homeowners are susceptible to various issues when determining the level of wildfire risk 
reducing activities they will pursue. Homeowners often weight the amenity and privacy values of 
flammable fuels on their property with the risk reduction associated with removing those fuels. These 
values drive the under provision of private risk mitigation activities (Kobayashi et al. 2010, Paveglio et al. 
2016). Alaskan homeowners also have permafrost soils to contend with, as any threat to those soils 
threatens the structural integrity of structures built on them. In this context, the shade provided by 
flammable fuels is not only a preference, but a necessity for the stability of their homes. Any failure of 
objective information being disseminated to homeowners has detrimental consequences on the actions 
needed to reduce wildfire risk. Subjective assessment of wildfire risk is also a noteworthy driver risk 
(Brenkert-Smith et al. 2012), as it was found to be a better indicator of homeowner risk mitigation actions 
than having previous wildfire experience (Martin et al. 2009). The survey chapter addresses many of 
these themes, including the effects of free-riding behavior, insurance, and defensible space have on 
mitigation actions on private lands.
Chapter 3 addresses many of the same themes that are presented in chapter 2. The electronic 
survey also included a choice experiment to more quantitatively capture willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
risk reduction variables. Specifically, the choice experiment estimates WTP for neighbors reducing fuels 
on their property, public land fuel treatments, and direct risk reductions to both the respondent and their 
neighbors. Choice experiments isolate individual preferences for variable attributes by comparing 
respondent choices. By repeating these choices and including more respondents, preferences for variable 
attributes emerge and are quantified monetarily. The WTP estimates provide insight into potential 
avenues to increase homeowner risk mitigation behavior and how land management agencies can best 
contribute to preferred behaviors. An adaptive method was used which both allowed for on-the-fly choice 
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set design, as well as Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of the data. This chapter also used survey responses 
to examine how WTP estimates change based on location (borough), subjective and objective risk, 
previous experience with wildfire, and insurance considerations.
Chapter 4 attempts to assess the problem most directly with an econometric cost model estimating 
factors that affect total suppression costs. Wildfire costs have increased over time since the 1970's 
(Calkin et al. 2005, Gorte 2013) and are expected to continue increasing due to climate-based changes and 
more intense fires. These models can be difficult to analyze because of the endogeneity (reverse causality) 
present in suppression variables. The inclusion of endogenous variables requires the careful use of 
instrumental variables to accurately estimate these effects. The analysis of these variables (endogenous 
and instrumental) are useful on its own and can provide useful evidence for future studies. The primary 
variable of interest is fuel treatments, as this variable will determine the effect these treatments have on 
suppression costs. The number of control variables included in the cost models are wildfire protection 
zone, wildfire cause (human or lightning), year of fire, acres burned, days burning, slope, elevation, fuel 
type, and other climate variables.
The work presented here builds from previous literature but makes its own significant 
contribution to the larger body of research. Discreet choice experiments are not ubiquitous in natural 
resource economic research, especially in its application to homeowner's incentives regarding wildfire 
risk reduction. By constructing the choice experiment variables such that homeowner's risk and 
neighbor's risk were disconnected, it allows us to investigate themes such as altruism, free riding, and 
vegetative amenity values in a novel way. The population surveyed also allows us to investigate WUI 
communities that have unique challenges and characteristics, such as permafrost, subarctic temperatures 
and lack of infrastructure. Combining willingness-to-pay estimates with survey and sociodemographic 
responses allows for the analysis of distinct groups that innovatively explore these homeowner 
preferences. As with any new research, a careful balance between novelty and supporting literature is 
critical when investigating significant but original problems.
As with any research, this work still leaves many questions unanswered. Future studies should 
leverage increases in wildfire data for both survey and econometric purposes to more completely inform 
these models. Evacuations due to imminent wildfire provide an external event that may influence 
homeowner responses in affected areas. For example, the Shovel Creek fire of 2019 forced evacuations in 
the area north west of Fairbanks. Because this area was surveyed in 2016, follow up surveys can identify 
how respondent preferences have changed. There is still much to investigate when examining the 
effectiveness of fuel treatments in Alaska. Please note that this work is formatted as a manuscript and as 
such, the chapters will have different structure based on the proposed publication setting.
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Chapter 2 Homeowner Preferences of Wildfire Risk Mitigation in the Alaskan Wildland Urban Interface - 
Selected Survey Results1
1 This chapter is currently being prepared externally for academic journal publication. Other authors on that 
manuscript include Joseph Little (University of Alaska Fairbanks), Stacy Drury (USDA - US Forest Service), Randi 
Jandt (University of Alaska Fairbanks) and Brock Lane (University of Alaska Fairbanks).
Abstract
Alaska has the unique distinction of being the largest state in the US, as well as one of the least 
populated. This gives rise to increased expansion of homeowners into the Wildland Urban Interface 
(WUI). Probabilistic wildfire events are examined from the perspective of a natural hazard. Common 
hazard themes are explored to study the human dimension of these wildfire events. These themes 
include risk perception, insurance, and common incentives for risk mitigation activities. We also 
compare how two different Alaskan boroughs differ in this context. We examine how homeowners in 
different wildfire risk areas make different mitigation action decisions. There is evidence of risk 
perception issues across both boroughs, with homeowners regularly misidentifying their own 
objective wildfire risk. There is also evidence that the amenity values associated with flammable fuels 
may disincentive homeowner participation in wildfire risk reducing activities. Homeowners are not 
influenced by risk perception when deciding to purchase homeowner's insurance. Lastly, land 
management agency participation in fuel reduction was not seen as a preferred method of risk 
mitigation, as community capacity building, increased participation and direct payments were much 
more preferred.
2.1 Introduction
The wildland urban interface (WUI) is an important piece in the context of the human impacts 
from wildfire. The formal definition from Radeloff et al. (2005) is that the Wildland Urban Interface is 
“the area where houses meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland vegetation.” Some Alaskan WUI 
areas are sparsely populated, with small communities being directly adjacent to dense wild forests. This in 
turn increases the risk homeowners face from wildfire, both in wildfire attacking their individual lot lines, 
and the risk of home structure ignition. When a wildfire event begins close to these WUI communities, 
there may be little time for suppression efforts. The probabilistic nature of wildfire also makes it difficult 
to anticipate how they will threaten individual WUI communities. The focus on building adaptive 
capacity in these neighborhoods then lay within a pre-suppression effort that can handle a wide array of 
wildfire threats. It has been shown that pre-suppression risk mitigation efforts can reduce the overall 1
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impacts and costs of wildfire (Lankoande and Yoder 2006). Individual homeowners can act on their own 
property to combat this potential threat and to decrease their own risk, exclusive of any other external risk 
mitigation activity. However, these actions can also have a spatial benefit beyond the individual 
homeowner's lot lines. Communal risk reduction can be maximized from the optimal placement of pre­
suppression efforts (Butry and Donovan 2008). Community level programs can help with these large- 
scale examinations of WUI communities in high-risk areas. They can increase wildfire risk information, 
increase neighbor interactions, and help plan and execute suppression actions on private homeowner 
lands. These programs rely on a thorough understanding of what incentivizes homeowners to take risk 
mitigation actions and what may be stopping them from participating on a community wide scale. There 
is also a need to examine how different groups of people in high-risk WUI communities behave based on 
the distribution of risk or presence of natural amenities (Champ et al. 2013). This paper aims to discuss 
these topics via a survey of homeowners in two Alaskan Boroughs on homeowner participation in 
wildfire risk reduction activities.
The state of Alaska is distinctive in many regards, but the size of the state creates wildfire risk 
scenarios that produce difficult suppression situations. The small population of the state and the spatial 
distribution of its residents increase the proportion of population living in WUI locations. The state is in a 
challenging situation where they may lack key infrastructure to provide the best suppression protection, 
and limited resources to provide optimal pre-suppression actions. It is then critical for the state to address 
these issues and identify how to optimally leverage state resources to reduce the risk of loss from wildfire 
events. It is also important to understand how homeowners respond to land management agency (LMA) 
action. Alaskan homeowners may respond to these actions with their own risk mitigation actions, while 
others may acquire a misguided sense of security from reduced community wildfire risk. Before LMAs 
act, it is important to know just how homeowners will respond and how those actions fit into the larger 
conversation of community wildfire risk reduction.
Alaska provides an interesting spatial backdrop with respect to risk perception. Alaska is the most 
sparsely populated state in the US. In 2017, there were 739,795 people living within the state area of 
663,300 square miles. Not only does this drastically increase the probability of naturally occurring 
wildfire affecting the state, but potentially increases the proportion of residents who are in WUI locations. 
There are only a handful of population centers, but these include the Anchorage/Mat-Su area, the 
Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB), the Kenai Peninsula Borough (KPB), and the southeast 
(Juneau/Ketchikan). The Anchorage/Mat-Su area is by far the largest and most densely populated, with 
about half of the total state residents, while the southeast is a chain of islands and peninsulas. The other 
two, FNSB and the KPB have expansive WUI communities and are particularly at risk for destructive 
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wildfires. However, because most residents huddle within population centers within boroughs, there may 
be a false perception of safety within those communities. Based on Community Wildfire Protection Plans 
(CWPPs) that were developed for boroughs wildfire preparedness, virtually the entire inhabited coast of 
the KPB has an “extreme” wildfire risk rating. This is primarily due to the surrounding wildlands, fuel 
types and densities that could make a large wildfire catastrophic to those communities. But these 
aggregate risks may be lost from view from the perspective of a homeowner surrounded by homes in a 
large development. Residents in the KPB were found to reduce their risk perception related to fuels and 
proximity hazards primarily because of a reduction in spruce bark beetles damaged trees and less 
experience with previous wildfires (Gordon et al. 2013). While these issues should reduce risk 
perceptions, it may dominate the conversation, and give residents the false sense of significantly lowered 
levels of overall wildfire risk.
The objective risk of Alaskan communities is evaluated by borough wide CWPPs. Wildfire 
suppression agencies and other wildfire experts help guide communities with best practices and risk 
identification by developing these plans. The plans also define the areas at greatest risk and devise plans 
to increase adaptive capacity for those living there. The two areas of interest for this study are the 
Fairbanks-North Star Borough (FNSB) and the Kenai Peninsula Borough (KPB). Each of these areas have 
CWPPs that are constantly reexamined and updated with the most current and reliable science. Each of 
these plans define specific areas at risk of wildfire. Their flammable fuel loads and topography partly 
define the risk these zones. In the FNSB, these boundaries are defined as high, very high and extreme risk 
of wildfire. The KPB has similar nomenclature, however their boundaries are defined as low, moderate, 
high and extreme risk of wildfire. For the sake of this analysis, we combine the naming conventions for 
continuity2. These definitions become the objective metric to assess homeowner risk in these boroughs. 
Both risk zones maps can be seen in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
2 The KPB naming is changed to reflect the FNSB naming, where the three highest risk zones are defined in the 
same way as in the FNSB CWPP. The low risk zone is dropped as it has no comparable category in the FNSB 
CWPP.
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Figure 2.1: Objective risk zones in the Fairbanks-North Star Borough. Areas in yellow are in high 
risk, orange are in very high risk, and red are in extreme risk. Map generated in ArcMap (GIS).
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Figure 2.2: Objective risk zones in the Kenai Peninsula Borough. Legend seen below and 




The occurrence of a nearby wildfire may objectively threaten homes in WUI locations. These 
homeowners can protect themselves by following best practices for the removal of fuels and treatment of 
flammable vegetation on their property. From a utility maximization standpoint, homeowners are 
balancing the perceived risk of loss with the direct and indirect costs of these best practices. More 
formally, the homeowner will act when:
However, this framework assumes that homeowners are acutely aware of all risks, as well as the 
fundamental likelihood wildfire will threaten their property. Perfect or even sufficient information is often 
lacking for many WUI homeowners. Risk perception then becomes a key variable in determining whether 
these actions take place (Champ et al. 2013). A 2012 study showed that risk perception, specifically 
questions regarding flammable fuels on the property and overall wildfire risk were statistically significant 
contributors to mitigation actions being taken on a homeowner's property (Brenkert-Smith et al 2012). 
This was also studied in-depth by Martin et al. (2009) who found that risk perception was a stronger 
indicator than previous wildfire experience for mitigation actions. Professional assessments, like those 
found in CWPPs often diverge from individual, non-expert assessments of overall wildfire risk (Meldrum 
et al. 2015). This creates a scenario, where objective, professional assessments are not resonating with 
homeowners, either because of inefficient information channels, or the perceived subjectivity of risk 
factors. There also seems to be some disconnect between perceived efficacies of mitigation treatments 
among homeowners (Wilson et al. 2017). Even when actions are taken, subjective assessments of wildfire 
risk perception can inhibit actual and necessary risk reduction to homeowner land in WUI communities.
2.2.2 Insurance
When a homeowner appropriately assesses risk on their property, they may decide to reduce their 
risk via mitigation actions. However, this is only one choice out of a complex matrix of decisions that a 
homeowner may take. Another is to avert monetary loss with homeowner's insurance. While it is often 
cited as a smaller piece of the decision-making process, institutional factors like homeowner's insurance 
may be prevalent in those who chose to not partake in mitigation actions (Brenkert et al. 2005). When 
faced with the decision to pursue mitigation actions or cover loss with insurance premiums, several 
factors must be analyzed by the decision maker. In perfect information situations, these decisions will 
depend on the actual probability of risk, cost of mitigation action, discount rates, value of the home, 
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insurance premium costs, and predicted years until occurred loss. In the hazard risk mitigation literature, 
these values help with internal benefit/cost analysis for individual homeowner decision making 
(Kunreuther 1996). In this context, the choice that provides the best benefit/cost ratios in the shortest 
amount of time will be the best objective decision. However, there is rarely a situation in which perfect 
probability information exists, as much of this information is unavailable for homeowner decision 
making. Underestimation of probability can drastically skew these internal calculations. As mentioned in 
the previous section, differences in perceived risk and the probabilistic nature of wildfire can push 
homeowners into non-optimal situations. From a utility standpoint, a homeowner will choose to insure 
their home over mitigation actions when
U risk reduction to covered loss >U saved premium cost
This is not to imply that one cannot chose to take on both activities. Non-covered losses may require 
additional actions that reduce both covered and non-covered losses for those who are more risk averse 
(Talberth et al. 2006). In that case, the utility drivers of that decision are when
U risk reduction to covered loss + U risk reduction to non-covered losses >U saved premium cost + U saved mitigation costs
For these individuals, we would expect a more complex benefit/cost calculation that would include 
internal valuation of non-covered losses. These decisions are still affected by a difference in perceived 
and actual risk probabilities. Perceived risk was found to be a major determining factor for homeowners 
choosing insurance, with those who perceived higher risk consistently being more likely to purchase 
hazard protection policies (Kunreuther 1996).
2.2.3 Incentivizing Mitigation Actions
While homeowners have complex internal decision-making processes that guide their behavior, 
external factors may be able to incentivize risk mitigation actions. One such incentive could be the 
treatment of fuels on nearby public lands. When an LMA chooses to be a participant in the risk mitigation 
process, it may incentive others to participate. However, there are a few issues when approaching 
homeowners in this way. The first is that many homeowner's do not believe that there is a requirement for 
government intervention at all relating to the reduction of private homeowner risk (McCaffrey et al. 
2011). When the onus is on the homeowner to mitigate wildfire risk, LMAs may be best served as 
educators and stewards of their own lands. The second issue that arises, is that there is evidence of a 
“crowding out” effect, where LMA mitigation actions are perceived to be sufficient, and dissuade 
homeowners from spending as much as they may need on their own risk mitigation actions (Prante et al. 
2011, Talberth et al. 2006). The dissemination of private homeowner actions and contingent policies on 
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LMA participation seem to reduce this effect. When LMA participation is seen in the larger context of all 
external participants, this incentivization may be stronger. There is also the potential to leverage the 
strong social component to incentivize mitigation behavior. Homeowners are more likely to participate in 
wildfire risk reduction programs when their community is working together and when increasing adaptive 
capacity to wildfire is the standard (Sturtevant & McCaffrey 2006). Some of the economic decision­
making previously discussed may also be abated by highlighting the social advantages of risk mitigation 
participation. Peer pressure has been shown to be effective at increasing participation of neighborhood 
wide risk mitigation (McCaffrey et al. 2011), as well as preexisting community institutions (McFarlane et 
al. 2007).
Even with these incentives, individual level utility maximization and cost minimization may 
induce free riding behaviors. In this context, free riding behaviors are ones that keep individual costs 
minimal, while receiving the non-excludable community wide wildfire risk reduction from other 
homeowner risk mitigation actions. Because community level risk mitigation actions reduce the 
probability of wildfire interactions, there may be little incentive for everyone to participate, especially 
when the marginal increase in overall neighborhood risk reduction may not be cost effective. This 
potentially creates a contradiction where the incentivization of risk reduction activities in some 
homeowners reduces participation in others. This “wildfire risk mitigation paradox” has been examined 
and generally shows that these free riding agents contribute to the overall under provision of homeowner 
participation (Little et al. 2017). Yet again, information sharing becomes a potential tool to combat this 
paradox, as the development of social capital has been shown to mitigate the negative effects of wildfire 
risk reduction (Prante et al. 2011). In general, even with the mitigation paradox and crowding out effects, 
there are many factors that influence the overall adaptive capacity of a community, and care should be 
taken to leverage variables within communities to maximize effectiveness (Paveglio et al. 2012).
2.2.4 Method
An electronic survey was developed to address a wide range of homeowner preferences. 
Lighthouse studio (formerly Sawtooth) software was chosen for survey implementation. The software 
allowed us to create logic gates and pathing to keep the cognitive burden on respondents as low as 
possible. Questions were multiple choice and multiple selection, with the occasional option for writing in 
other responses. There were 41 multiple choice/select questions on the survey, with two comment boxes 
and a supplementary choice experiment which is not included in this analysis. Our sample selection starts 
with the identification of those homeowners in the high-risk areas of the FNSB and the KPB. 
Homeowners in these high-risk areas were spatially identified using publicly available tax parcel 
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information. From this expansive list, 1000 homeowners were randomly selected3 from each borough, 
with a range of risk zones. Once selected, we followed a modified Dillman survey method to increase our 
response rate (Hoddinott 1986). An initial postcard invitation helped us identify out of date addresses, and 
two follow-up letters reminded homeowners of the importance of the project. We also gave the option for 
a printed survey for those without access to the internet4. While not everyone answered all items, a total 
of 388 homeowners participated in the survey (a response rate of 19.4%). Various statistical tests were 
used on the resulting data, including t-tests, ANOVA and χ2 tests. The t test was used primarily to 
compare the means for survey responses across different sociodemographic groups, while the χ2 tests 
assessed contingency table variable correlation. The contingency tables presented here evaluate the 
correlation between variables to find connections among different groups of respondents.
3 Homeowners were selected using the RAND() function in Microsoft Excel.
4 Only one mail survey was requested and was never returned.
2.3 Introduction to the Survey and Survey Results
Survey questions included sociodemographic questions, as well as questions focused on wildfire 
risk, risk perceptions, neighborhood engagement, and preferences for wildfire risk reducing activities. 
This portion of the survey was designed to take approximately 50% of the total survey time. The 
questions were designed to keep the cognitive burden low, as to not strain respondents with an extensive 
survey. The multiple-choice/select style survey questions were grouped into five categories (with Section 
5 being reserved for the choice experiment):
Section 1: Questions About Your Home and Property
Section 2: Activities You Take to Reduce Wildfire Risk
Section 3: Land Management Agencies and You
Section 4: Your Neighbors and Their Property
Section 6: Sociodemographic Questions
The two locations for this survey were the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB), as well and the Kenai 
Peninsula Borough (KPB). Homeowners in these areas where also categorized by their objective wildfire 
risk as defined by their respective Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP). The National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group also makes recommendations that were used in the creation of the risk assessment 
questions in the survey.
While the organization of this chapter will follow that of the survey, there are many overlapping 
themes to consider when discussing these results. Risk, perceived risk, borough differences, insurance, 
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and risk reducing activities will be discussed both as it arises in the survey, and as a more comprehensive 
topic once the survey can be examined in its entirety.
2.3.1 Questions About Your Home and Property
Maintaining a defensible space around a home is a key component to protecting property from 
wildfire. This includes keeping flammable fuel sources and unmaintained vegetation away from the 
building structure, preferably at least 100ft away from the home (National Fire Protection Agency - 
Firewise 2019). Initial questions in this section detailed the property and home sizes of the respondents, 
as well as the length of time the respondents have owned their property. One of the more integral 
questions asked in this section was related to the defensible space around the respondent's home. 
Defensible space is defined as the area around a home that is free from vegetation, or flammable non- 
vegetative fuel sources. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommends homeowners 
eliminate all combustible materials within at least 30 feet of the home. Table 2.1 outlines the defensible 
space responses across the entire survey as well as the values for the individual boroughs. Most homes 
(66.9%) represented in this survey had combustible materials within 30 feet of the main structure. The 
KPB respondents reported 10% more homes that had combustible materials within 30 feet compared to 
homes in the FNSB. There is a statistically significant difference between respondents by borough in 
reported defensible space (χ2p value = 0.046). When evaluated at mean proportions, FNSB homeowners 
report more defensible space than KPB homeowners. While this variable can have an interesting 
interpretation about the state of homes in these boroughs, we can also use this variable to categorize other 
survey data in order to describe other types of risk reducing behavior.
Table 2.1: Defensible space responses by borough and for all respondents in total. (χ2p value = 0.046)
Defensible Space FNSB KPB Total
0-10 ft 58 (24.7%) 48 (35.0%) 106 (28.5%)
10-30 ft 91 (38.7%) 52 (38.0%) 143 (38.4%)
30-100 ft 83 (35.3%) 33 (24.1%) 116 (31.2%)
Further than 100ft 3 (1.3%) 4 (2.9%) 7 (1.9%)
Total 235 (100%) 137 (100%) 372 (100%)
Percentage of Homes with
flammable material within 30 ft of
home 63.40% 72.99% 66.94%
These values change when looking at the risk breakdowns. Table 2.2 shows that the objective 
wildfire risk zone was also found to be a significant indicator of defensible space (χ2p value = 0.048). 
Those in the ‘Extreme' fire risk zone tended to keep unmaintained vegetation further away than those in 
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relatively lower risk areas. Table 2.2 also shows the overall sample of respondents who took part in the 
survey based on their objective wildfire risk.
Table 2.2: Defensible space responses by risk zone and for all respondents in total. (χ2 p value = 0.048). 
Also includes counts for objective risk zone by borough.
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk Total
within 0-10 ft. from home 24 (25.8%) 54 (34.8%) 28 (22.6%) 106 (28.5%)
within 10-30 ft. from home 42 (45.2%) 59 (38.1%) 42 (33.9%) 143 (38.4%)
within 30-100 ft. from home 27 (29%) 38 (24.5%) 51 (41.1%) 116 (31.2%)
further than 100 ft. from home 0 (0%) 4 (2.6%) 3 (2.4%) 7 (1.9%)
Total 93 (100%) 155 (100%) 124 (100%) 372 (100%)
FNSB 99 (100%) 99 (62.7%) 45 (34.4%) 243 (62.6%)
KPB 0 (0%) 59 (37.3%) 86 (65.6%) 145 (37.4%)
Total 99 (100%) 158 (100%) 131 (100%) 388 (100%)
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of housing construction materials by borough. There are three variables 
created to categorize the construction materials. The “Percentage of people with Wood or Asphalt roofs” 
was defined to draw attention to homeowners who do not have the optimal roofing material to defend 
against home ignition due to wildfire. The “Percentage of people with flammable siding” was defined to 
include homeowners who had either log, timber, or wood siding. Finally, the number of respondents who 
indicated they had a balcony, deck, or porch made of wood was compared with the total number of 
respondents for that question to get the “Percentage of respondents that have a balcony, deck, or porch 
made of wood” value.
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Table 2.3: Responses to home construction materials questions broken down by borough. Includes 
percentages of those falling into created categories.
FNSB KPB Total
Wood (Shake) Shingles 6 4 10
Asphalt Shingles 99 63 162
Metal, Tile, or other Non-combustible
roofing 131 73 204
Log or Timber siding 35 32 67
Wood siding 136 78 214
Vinyl siding 30 17 47
Cement, Brick, Stone or other
masonry siding 10 11 21
Balcony, Deck, or Porch made of
wood 162 104 266
Percentage of people with Wood or
Asphalt roofs 44.49% 47.86% 45.74%
Percentage of people with flammable
siding 81.04% 79.71% 80.52%
Percentage of respondents that have a 
balcony, deck, or porch made of wood 68.07% 74.29% 70.37%
Number of Respondents 238 140 378
Based on the information from the table, many of the homes represented in the survey are built with either 
flammable, or non-optimal material. While only a few respondents indicated that they had wood shingles, 
many indicated that they had asphalt shingles5. Close to 50% of all homes were built from either one of 
these non-optimal roofing materials. There is only roughly a 3% difference in the number of non-optimal 
roofs in the FNSB compared to the KPB. The number of homeowners who indicated they had flammable 
siding was very high. This was due primarily from the large number of people with wood siding. While 
the specifics of the state of the material were not examined, these homes still represent a non-optimal 
construction in terms of ignition risk from wildfire. Again, there is only a slight difference in these values 
due to location (only about 1.3%). Finally, a similarly high number of homeowners indicated that they 
had a balcony, deck, or porch made of wood.
5 While asphalt shingles are not inherently a poor choice for minimizing ignition risk due to wildfire, they do have a 
wide range of flammability. We cannot be assured of their fire resistance or ignition risk minimization based on the 
construction material alone. This is the justification to classify them as non-optimal for the sake of this analysis.
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Table 2.4: Responses to home construction materials questions broken down by wildfire risk. Includes 
total number of respondents in each wildfire risk zone.
High Very high Extreme Total
Wood (Shake) Shingles 3 4 3 10
Asphalt Shingles 49 64 49 162
Metal, Tile, or other Non-combustible
roofing 46 84 74 204
Log or Timber siding 12 30 25 67
Wood siding 61 83 70 214
Vinyl siding 11 21 15 47
Cement, Brick, Stone or other masonry
siding 4 10 7 21
Balcony, Deck, or Porch made of wood 69 110 87 266
Percentage of people with Wood or
Asphalt roofs 53.06% 44.74% 41.27% 45.74%
Percentage of people with flammable
siding 82.95% 78.47% 81.20% 80.52%
Percentage of respondents that have a 
balcony, deck, or porch made of wood 70.41% 71.43% 69.05% 70.37%
Number of Respondents 98 154 126 378
Table 2.4 shows the distribution of home construction materials, but with respect to wildfire risk 
zones. In percentage terms, we observe similar values when comparing the data from table 2.4 to table 
2.3. There was little change in these values across risk zones for flammable siding and exterior wooden 
structures. However, there does seem to be a significant change in roofing material used for homes in the 
different wildfire risk zones. A little more than half (53.06%) of all homes represented in the survey that 
were in “High” wildfire risk had non-optimal roofing material. This value drops more than 8% when 
moving to the “Very High” risk zone (44.74%). It further drops another 3.5% from the “Very High” risk 
zones to the “Extreme” risk zones (41.27%). In total, there is an 11.8% difference in this value from 
“High” wildfire risk to “Extreme” wildfire risk. The direction of the change indicates that as the risk 
increases, the non-optimality of roofing material decreases. While it may be tempting to suggest that this 
observation is due to homeowners reacting to higher wildfire risk, or more neighborhood information 
outreach, we should keep in mind that we do not see the same changes in other areas of similarly priced 
home building construction material (wood siding or wooden decks).
Respondents were asked what the wildfire risk was to their property if a wildfire event occurred 
in their neighborhood. We see pertinent discrepancies when these responses are compared to the 
respondent's objective wildfire risk from the CWPP. Table 2.5 shows how respondents identified their 
own subjective risk in comparison to their objective risk. This is of critical importance, as 
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misidentification of risk may lead to under provision of mitigation actions. Only 29% of respondents in 
the FNSB properly identified their wildfire risk as “High”. Those in extreme risk areas identified their 
risk slightly better than those in other risk zones. The majority of KNSB respondents labeled their risk as 
medium or low (71%). The KPB was only slightly better with 33% of respondents properly identifying 
their risk to wildfire and 67% incorrectly identifying their risk. Those KPB residents in extreme risk 
zones were again slightly more aware of their own risk to wildfire. However, these small differences were 
not statistically significant in the aggregate when comparing the mean responses between boroughs (t test 
p value=0.3). This suggests that the problem of misidentification of risk in endemic to all Alaskan 
homeowners in high wildfire risk WUI areas.
Table 2.5: Subjective risk vs. objective risk by borough. Responses to the question: “If a wildfire occurred 
in your neighborhood, how would you rate your property's risk of wildfire?” broken down by objective 
respondent CWPP risk zone. (FNSB χ2 p value = 0.71 KPB χ2 p value = 0.77).
If a wildfire occurred in your 
neighborhood, how would you 









CWPP Risk - 
Extreme Total
FNSB
high 27 (27.8%) 28 (28.9%) 14 (32.6%) 69 (29.1%)
medium 50 (51.5%) 48 (49.5%) 24 (55.8%) 122 (51.5%)
low 20 (20.6%) 21 (21.6%) 5 (11.6%) 46 (19.4%)
FNSB Totals 97 (100%) 97 (100%) 43 (100%) 237 (100%)
KPB
high - 15 (26.3%) 31 (37.8%) 46 (33.1%)
medium - 28 (49.1%) 42 (51.2%) 70 (50.4%)
low - 14 (24.6%) 9 (11.0%) 23 (16.5%)
KPB Totals - 57 (100%) 82 (100%) 139 (100%)
Another measure of risk assessment comes from another question in the survey. Respondents 
were asked “Which statement best describes your perception of the risk wildfire presents to your home?” 
Respondents were given choices ranging from “Wildfire will threaten my home in the next 10 years” to 
“Wildfire will not threaten my home in the next 10 years”6. These responses can be organized into two 
groups: those that believe wildfire will have some effect on their home in the next 10 years, and those that 
do not. Those that self-identified as not having any idea of their wildfire risk in this context were included 
in the latter group, as they were not aware of the objective wildfire risk. Given the risk factors in the WUI 
locations of respondents, most homeowners should acknowledge some risk of wildfire to their homes, 
6 The full range of responses included “will not”, “will probably not”, “will probably” and “will” as modifiers to the 
risk assessment.
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even in the timespan as short as 10 years. With this assumption, we can again compare those who 
correctly identify their risk. Table 2.6 shows how those in the FNSB and KPB responded with respect to 
their wildfire risk zone. Again, we see that most respondents indicated they were at less risk than actual 
CWPP wildfire risk. Only 46% of FNSB respondents thought that wildfire may threaten their homes in 
the next 10 years. While there are small changes between the actual risk zones, these changes were shown 
to not be significant (χ2 test p value = 0.937). We can see a similar result in the KPB, with a smaller 43% 
indicating that wildfire may threaten their home in the next 10 years. Again, the results from KPB 
respondents are not statistically different from the FNSB responses for this question (t test p 
value=0.513). While these percentages are larger than in the previous table, they still suggest a couple of 
things. One, a lack of information is a persistent issue for homeowners in these areas, and two, there were 
no statistical differences between the borough respondents, again indicating a constant issue with a lack of 
information amongst Alaskan WUI homeowners. These assertions are based on the assumption that all 
respondents in the sample should expect some threat (non-zero) to their homes over the next 10 years 
based on their objective CWPP risk.
Table 2.6: Risk perception vs. objective risk by borough. Responses to question “Which statement best 
describes your perception of the risk wildfire presents to your home?” split by borough and objective 
wildfire risk. (FNSB χ2 p value =0.94 KPB χ2 p value = 0.15).
Which statement best describes 
your perception of the risk 
wildfire presents to your 
home?
FNSB
High Very High Extreme Total
Will/May threaten 46 (46.9%) 43 (44.8%) 19 (44.2%) 108 (45.6%)
Will/May not threaten 52 (53.1%) 53 (55.2%) 24 (55.8%) 129 (54.4%)
FNSB Total 98 (100.0%) 96 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 237 (100.0%)
KPB
Will/May threaten - 20 (35.7%) 39 (48.1%) 59 (43.1%)
Will/May not threaten - 36 (64.3%) 42 (51.9%) 78 (56.9%)
KPB Total - 56 (100.0%) 81 (100.0%) 137 (100.0%)
Approximately 10% of respondents indicated that they did not purchase homeowner's insurance 
when asked about their insurance premiums (36 out of 375). These homeowners may not have 
homeowner's insurance for different reasons, including low home values, the lack of a mortgage 
payment, or low risk aversion. When compared to respondents who purchased homeowner's insurance, 
there were no statistically significant changes in risk perception responses. Table 2.7 shows a contingency 
table for insured and noninsured respondents and risk perception counts. The two questions being 
compared are the two previous risk perception questions: “Which statement best describes your
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perception of the risk wildfire presents to your home?” (describe risk) and “If a wildfire occurred in your 
neighborhood, how would you rate your property's risk of wildfire?” (risk to property) These two 
questions were statistically equivalent for insured and noninsured homeowners (risk to prop χ2 p 
value=0.682 and describe risk χ2 p value=0.1887). A t test also supports this, which gives p values of 
0.458 and 0.167 when comparing the mean responses for each question across insured status. This facet 
of homeowner behavior is notoriously difficult to examine, as lenders often require homeowner's 
insurance as a contingency of the loan. From this perspective, we can adjust our groups, from insured vs 
uninsured, to well insured and not well insured. We define a well-insured homeowner as someone who 
pays over $100 per month, and a not well-insured homeowner as all others. However, doing this also 
gives us the same result, as seen in table 2.8 (χ2 and respective t test p values are both greater than 0.1). 
For these Alaskan homeowners, responses to this insurance question are not a good indicator of 
respondent risk perception.
Table 2.7: Insurance vs. risk perception and objective risk. Pair of 2x2 contingency tables showing the 
effects of insurance to risk perception questions: “describe risk” χ2 p value=0.19 and “risk to property” χ2 
p value=0.68.









Insured 130 129 72 187
Not
Insured 20 12 10 22
Table 2.8: Well insured vs. risk perception and objective risk. Pair of 2x2 contingency tables showing the 
effects of insurance to risk perception questions: “describe risk” χ2 p value=0.26 and “risk to property” χ2 
p value=0.46.










Insured 63 90 43 110
Not Well
Insured 104 117 70 151
2.3.2 Activities You Take to Reduce Wildfire Risk - Land Management Agencies and You
The second and third sections of the survey look at what actions homeowners have taken on their 
property, and how surrounding lands affect their decision making with respect to wildfire risk mitigation. 
A simple binary choice question opens section 2: “Have you taken any action to reduce wildfire risk to 
your property?” This question acted as a gate that allowed respondents to explain what type of mitigation 
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actions they have taken or skip to other questions. This provided a small relief from the survey's cognitive 
burden for any respondent who hadn't participated in any mitigation actions. The descriptive statistics of 
this and the following questions are shown in tables 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11.
Table 2.9: Mitigation action vs. objective risk and borough. Responses to opening question broken down 




been done on your 
home or property? High Risk
Very High
Risk Extreme Risk FNSB KPB
All Risk
Levels
Yes 76 (81.7%) 136 (81.2%) 103 (81.8%) 200 (84.4%) 115 (83.3%) 315 (84.0%)
No 17 (18.3%) 20 (12.8%) 23 (18.2%) 37 (15.6%) 23 (16.7%) 60 (16.0%)
TOTAL: 93 (100%) 156 (100%) 126 (100%) 237 (100%) 138 (100%) 375 (100%)
Much of these specific mitigation actions showed no statistical difference when comparing 
groups. There was no discernable difference in the way homeowners in different boroughs chose 
mitigation actions (t test p values =0.78). This suggests that homeowners in these two boroughs 
participate in mitigation actions in a similar way. This is yet another example of there being no statistical 
difference in the way these two boroughs approach some aspect of wildfire mitigation. Table 2.12 shows 
that this was not the case when it comes to differences in wildfire risk areas. Four risk mitigation actions 
had differences amongst homeowner wildfire risk area. Regularly clearing leaves for risk reduction and 
appearance purposes showed significant differences in extreme and non-extreme risk zones, and High and 
non-high-risk zones respectively. Specifically, homeowners in extreme wildfire risk zones were less 
likely to clear leaves from their roofs for wildfire risk reduction than those in any other risk area. Home 
ignition probabilities may be increased when there are more flammable fuels on roofs, so this lack of 
action seems to be particularly alarming in an extreme risk area. Borough did not factor into this, as we 
compared objective risk areas only. This indicates that Alaskan homeowners in extreme risk areas are 
partaking in this activity less when compared to those in high, or very high areas. Those in high risk areas 
were more likely to clear leaves from their roofs for appearances, but less likely to keep the first 100 feet 
around the home cleared. Finally, those in extreme risk areas mowed tall grasses more often on their 
property for appearances when compared to those in very high-risk zones.
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Table 2.10: Frequency counts of mitigation actions taken by objective wildfire risk zones. Percentages are proportion of those who took that 
action from all those mitigate, and all respondents respectively.
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Respondents
installed fire resistant siding 6 (7.89%, 6.06%) 12 (8.82%, 7.59%) 8 (7.77%, 6.11%) 26 (8.25%, 6.93%)
installed fire resistant roofing 25 (32.89%, 25.25%) 50 (36.76%, 31.65%) 45 (43.69%, 34.35%) 120 (38.1%, 32%)
installed screening over roof vents 10 (13.16%, 10.1%) 18 (13.24%, 11.39%) 16 (15.53%, 12.21%) 44 (13.97%, 11.73%)
installed a chimney spark arrester 9 (11.84%, 9.09%) 24 (17.65%, 15.19%) 16 (15.53%, 12.21%) 49 (15.56%, 13.07%)
widened the road leading to property 19 (25%, 19.19%) 37 (27.21%, 23.42%) 27 (26.21%, 20.61%) 83 (26.35%, 22.13%)
regularly cleared leaves from roof to 
reduce wildfire risk 35 (46.05%, 35.35%) 62 (45.59%, 39.24%) 25 (24.27%, 19.08%)
122 (38.73%,
32.53%)
regularly cleared leaves from roof for 
appearance purposes 25 (32.89%, 25.25%) 28 (20.59%, 17.72%) 17 (16.5%, 12.98%) 70 (22.22%, 18.67%)
regularly cleared first 10 feet of land 
around your home of light brush 49 (64.47%, 49.49%) 82 (60.29%, 51.9%) 62 (60.19%, 47.33%)
193 (61.27%,
51.47%)
regularly cleared first 50 feet of land 
around your home of light brush 35 (46.05%, 35.35%) 71 (52.21%, 44.94%) 46 (44.66%, 35.11%)
152 (48.25%,
40.53%)
regularly cleared first 100 feet of land 
around your home of light brush 7 (9.21%, 7.07%) 29 (21.32%, 18.35%) 23 (22.33%, 17.56%) 59 (18.73%, 15.73%)
regularly cleared leaves from yard for 
appearance purposes 35 (46.05%, 35.35%) 52 (38.24%, 32.91%) 42 (40.78%, 32.06%) 129 (40.95%, 34.4%)
pruned and trimmed trees and bushes 59 (77.63%, 59.6%) 96 (70.59%, 60.76%) 72 (69.9%, 54.96%)
227 (72.06%,
60.53%)
cut down dead or decaying trees 62 (81.58%, 62.63%) 118 (86.76%, 74.68%) 89 (86.41%, 67.94%) 269 (85.4%, 71.73%)
187 (59.37%,
thinned dense areas of vegetation 50 (65.79%, 50.51%) 81 (59.56%, 51.27%) 56 (54.37%, 42.75%)
187 ( . ,
49.87%)
mowed long grasses to reduce wildfire risk 32 (42.11%, 32.32%) 71 (52.21%, 44.94%) 55 (53.4%, 41.98%)
158 (50.16%,
42.13%)
mowed long grasses for appearance 
purposes 41 (53.95%, 41.41%) 63 (46.32%, 39.87%) 62 (60.19%, 47.33%) 166 (52.7%, 44.27%)
other: [Respondent Specify] 10 (13.16%, 10.1%) 16 (11.76%, 10.13%) 14 (13.59%, 10.69%) 40 (12.7%, 10.67%)
N (answered yes to mitigation question) 76 136 103 315
N (all respondents) 99 158 131 388
Table 2.11: Frequency counts of mitigation actions taken by borough. Percentages are proportion of those who took that action from all those 
mitigate, and all respondents respectively.
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FNSB KPB All Respondents
installed fire resistant siding 14 (7%, 5.76%) 12 (10.43%, 8.28%) 26 (8.25%, 6.93%)
installed fire resistant roofing 78 (39%, 32.1%) 42 (36.52%, 28.97%) 120 (38.1%, 32%)
installed screening over roof vents 26 (13%, 10.7%) 18 (15.65%, 12.41%) 44 (13.97%, 11.73%)
installed a chimney spark arrester 27 (13.5%, 11.11%) 22 (19.13%, 15.17%) 49 (15.56%, 13.07%)
widened the road leading to property 
regularly cleared leaves from roof to reduce
51 (25.5%, 20.99%) 32 (27.83%, 22.07%) 83 (26.35%, 22.13%)
wildfire risk
regularly cleared leaves from roof for appearance
78 (39%, 32.1%) 44 (38.26%, 30.34%) 122 (38.73%, 32.53%)
purposes
regularly cleared first 10 feet of land around your
44 (22%, 18.11%) 26 (22.61%, 17.93%) 70 (22.22%, 18.67%)
home of light brush
regularly cleared first 50 feet of land around your
119 (59.5%, 48.97%) 74 (64.35%, 51.03%) 193 (61.27%, 51.47%)
home of light brush
regularly cleared first 100 feet of land around
92 (46%, 37.86%) 60 (52.17%, 41.38%) 152 (48.25%, 40.53%)
your home of light brush
regularly cleared leaves from yard for appearance
38 (19%, 15.64%) 21 (18.26%, 14.48%) 59 (18.73%, 15.73%)
purposes 80 (40%, 32.92%) 49 (42.61%, 33.79%) 129 (40.95%, 34.4%)
pruned and trimmed trees and bushes 148 (74%, 60.91%) 79 (68.7%, 54.48%) 227 (72.06%, 60.53%)
cut down dead or decaying trees 166 (83%, 68.31%) 103 (89.57%, 71.03%) 269 (85.4%, 71.73%)
thinned dense areas of vegetation 121 (60.5%, 49.79%) 66 (57.39%, 45.52%) 187 (59.37%, 49.87%)
mowed long grasses to reduce wildfire risk 101 (50.5%, 41.56%) 57 (49.57%, 39.31%) 158 (50.16%, 42.13%)
mowed long grasses for appearance purposes 105 (52.5%, 43.21%) 61 (53.04%, 42.07%) 166 (52.7%, 44.27%)
other: [Respondent Specify] 24 (12%, 9.88%) 16 (13.91%, 11.03%) 40 (12.7%, 10.67%)
N (answered yes to mitigation question) 200 115 315
N (all respondents) 243 145 388
Table 2.12: Mitigation action p value testing by objective risk and borough. p values for two tailed t tests 
comparing means for specified mitigation actions across objective wildfire risk and borough. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
t test
High vs Very
High High vs Extreme
Very High 
vs Extreme FNSB vs KPB
installed fire resistant siding 0.817 0.975 0.771 0.288
installed fire resistant roofing 0.574 0.145 0.281 0.664
installed screening over roof vents 0.987 0.658 0.616 0.515
installed a chimney spark arrester 0.266 0.484 0.666 0.185
widened the road leading to property 0.728 0.855 0.864 0.653
regularly cleared leaves from roof to
reduce wildfire risk 0.948 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.897
regularly cleared leaves from roof for
appearance purposes 0.047** 0.01*** 0.426 0.901
regularly cleared first 10 feet of land
around your home of light brush 0.55 0.562 0.988 0.397
regularly cleared first 50 feet of land
around your home of light brush 0.393 0.854 0.25 0.293
regularly cleared first 100 feet of land
around your home of light brush 0.024** 0.02** 0.853 0.872
regularly cleared leaves from yard for
appearance purposes 0.269 0.484 0.692 0.652
pruned and trimmed trees and bushes 0.269 0.251 0.909 0.314
cut down dead or decaying trees 0.314 0.382 0.936 0.113
thinned dense areas of vegetation 0.373 0.126 0.424 0.59
mowed long grasses to reduce wildfire
risk 0.16 0.137 0.856 0.874
mowed long grasses for appearance
purposes 0.289 0.406 0.034** 0.926
other: [Respondent Specify] 0.768 0.933 0.674 0.625
Respondents were asked what would discourage them from taking additional steps to reduce their 
wildfire risk. They were given the following responses and could select as many choices as applied. The 
selection choices and descriptive statistics are shown in table 2.13. Loss of privacy was the most selected 
reason (62% of all respondents) to not take any risk reduction action across all respondents.
Table 2.13: Disincentives to taking risk reducing actions. Responses to question regarding what would 
discourage a homeowner from undertaking risk mitigating actions.
What would discourage you from 
taking risk reduction actions? Count Sum % selected
Changing Landscape 375 51 13.6%
Losing Privacy 375 236 62.9%
Changing Views 375 63 16.8%
Losing Shade or Windbreaks 375 108 28.8%
Only Mitigation Participant 375 31 8.3%
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Respondents were then asked about potential incentives to encourage risk reduction actions. This allowed 
respondents to indicate their inducements, instead of deterrents as was asked in the previous question. We 
also included a follow-up question, which only focused on LMA actions on nearby public lands. The 
possible answer choices and descriptive statistics are included in table 2.14.
Table 2.14: Responses to question regarding fuel reduction preferences. Responses to the first question 
were multiple select and respondents could choose as many as applied. LMA preference question was 
multiple choice.
Which Method of LMA fuel reduction 
would you prefer? Count Sum % selected
Cleared public lands 373 85 22.8%
Shaded public lands 373 73 19.6%
Neighbors also reducing fuels 373 183 49.1%
neighborhood involvement (Firewise) 373 174 46.6%
Risk mitigation action subsidies 373 195 52.3%
Homeowners insurance premium discount 373 282 75.6%
Property tax discount 373 282 75.6%
Count Cleared Thinned None
LMA Preference 346 38 (11.0%) 277 (80.1%) 31 (9.0%)
For illustrative purposes, we can group these choices into three categories: LMA action (cleared 
and shaded public lands), neighborhood involvement (also includes neighbors reducing fuels), and direct 
payment (subsidies and discounts). The first group had the lowest response, with no significant difference 
between cleared and shaded public lands. This directly contradicts the responses from the follow-up 
question, where homeowners had a very clear preference for thinned fuel breaks. While it may be difficult 
to directly compare these two questions, we can draw a few conclusions from this difference. The first is 
that the follow-up question included graphic depictions of the fuel break, including what an untreated 
tract of land would look like. This is more informative than the text responses in the previous question. It 
also may indicate an information gap in terminology, as a shaded fuel treatment and a thinned fuel 
treatment are virtually synonymous. Finally, this discrepancy may not be a discrepancy at all if 
neighborhood involvement and direct payments are just much more preferred to LMA action. It is 
possible that for those who choose LMA actions, thinning is preferred over other options. The 
neighborhood involvement was preferred by almost half of all respondents, with no significant differences 
between specific options. Lastly, direct payment options were most preferred, with 52%-75% of 
respondents selecting one of these options. Within this group, discount to premiums and property taxes 
were significantly different from mitigation subsidies (t test p value <0.01 for both). Based on these 
responses, people preferred direct payments, neighborhood participation, and LMA action in that order. 
While any individual incentive may not be feasible, understanding these preferences may allow decision 
27
makers to appropriately make cost effective decisions when attempting to increase participation in 
community wide wildfire risk reduction.
2.3.3 Neighbors and their Property - Survey Respondent Demographics
The fourth and sixth sections of the survey covered neighborhood participation and 
sociodemographic questions respectively. These questions centered around the behavior of other 
neighborhood homeowners and their participation in risk mitigation activities. Respondents were asked 
about their closest neighbors' defensible space around their house. The answer choices were identical to 
those in section two, which asked about the homeowners own defensible space. Table 2.15 shows the 
results of this question split by borough. There was no statistical significance between boroughs from the 
defensible space that neighbors had around their property, with most neighbors clearing somewhere 
between 10-100 feet around their home (χ2 test p value < 0.66). Own defensible space was different 
between boroughs, while neighbor defensible space was not. This may seem to create of a contradiction, 
but respondents are assumed to have a random neighbor that does not correspond to their own mitigation 
actions. When viewed in the context of respondent self-selection, this difference may indicate that 
respondents in the FNSB were more inclined to keep larger defensible space than those in the KPB7.
7 Or conversely, KPB respondents who participated in the survey may have been less likely to keep larger defensible 
space.
Table 2.15: Neighbor defensible space by borough. Closest neighbor defensible space responses broken 
down by borough and for all respondents in total.
Defensible Space FNSB KPB Total
0-10 31 (12.8%) 22 (15.2%) 53 (13.7%)
10-30 67 (27.6%) 35 (24.1%) 102 (26.3%)
30-100 85 (35%) 40 (27.6%) 125 (32.2%)
100+ 31 (12.8%) 18 (12.4%) 49 (12.6%)
Total 243 (100%) 145 (100%) 388 (100%)
Free riding behavior was examined in the context of this defensible space question. The 
neighbors' defensible space responses were compared to the respondents own defensible space question. 
Table 2.16 shows the contingency table for respondents in the FNSB and the KPB. Both boroughs had 
significant differences between their own defensible space, and the defensible space of their closest 
neighbor. However, it seems that the most respondents at least matched the level of their neighbor's 
defensible space. This suggests that free riding communal risk reductions from defensible space was not 
commonplace in either borough. This may indicate a level of shared defensible space participation within 
a neighborhood. Other alternatives are presented in section 2.4.4.
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Table 2.16: Own defensible space vs. neighbor defensible space by borough. Two contingency tables 
examining the frequency of own defensible space and the closest neighbor's defensible space. Both tables 




FNSB 0-10 10-30 30-100 100+ Total
0-10 14 (26.4%) 8 (9.9%) 7 (9.5%) 1 (33.3%) 30
10-30 19 (35.8%) 31 (38.3%) 16 (21.6%) 0 (0%) 66
30-100 15 (28.3%) 29 (35.8%) 39 (52.7%) 2 (66.6%) 85




0-10 15 (36.6%) 5 (11.6%) 1 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 21
10-30 12 (29.3%) 19 (44.2%) 3 (11.5%) 1 (33.3%) 35
30-100 11 (26.8%) 15 (34.9%) 13 (50.0%) 0 (0%) 39
100+ 3 (7.3%) 4 (9.3%) 9 (34.6%) 2 (66.6%) 18
Sociodemographic indicators are shown in table 2.17. The median age for the population of 
Alaska was 33.5 in 2017. When comparing this to our survey sample demographics, we see that there is 
an upward shift in the age of our respondents. Only 35% of survey respondents were under the age of 50. 
This conflicts with data from the national Association of REALTORS which shows that nationally 62% 
of home buyers were younger than 52 (National Association of REALTORS Research Department 2018). 
This upward shift in age may influence other sociodemographic indicators, like income and education. 
Ethnicity responses weren't very illustrative, since 74% or respondents indicated that they were white. 
While this on its own can still be illustrative, the only other comparative group would be the 
amalgamation of all other ethnicities. This ‘minority' group would only comprise 4% or all respondents. 
Not only does this create its own inferencing trouble for associating responses with larger populations, it 
presumes homogeneity amongst those in that group. Many of the “other” responses included comments 
indicating the reluctance of homeowners to provide ethnicity information in this format, further 
compounding these analysis issues. Males were more likely to respond, with 62% of homeowners 
surveyed being male. This is different from general Alaskan demographics, with males making up 52.1% 
of the population. While approximately half of all Alaskans are married, 70% of those who gave marital 
status information were married. Education levels were also skewed upwards. 71% of the Alaskan 
population has not received a bachelor's degree, while only 42.6% or our sample was in the same group. 
In general, our survey respondents were more likely to be older married males with higher education 
degrees and higher incomes. Table 2.18 shows the sociodemographic makeup of our sample and how it 
differs from state and national benchmarks. Again, the largest discrepancies are in education, age, and 
income.
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Table 2.17: Table of sample demographics of all survey respondents. Categories include age, ethnicity, 
gender, marital status, income, employment, education and household size.
Age # Marital Status # Employment Status #
20-30 7 single 54 unemployed 17
30-40 47 married 235 self employed 44
40-50 62 divorced 30 part time 20 less 12
50-60 86 separated 1 part time 20-39 21
60-70 95 widowed 14 full time 160
70-80 33 (blank) 54 retired 80
80-90 4 Grand Total 388 (blank) 54
(blank) 54 Income # Grand Total 388
Grand Total 388 less than 10k 5 Education #
Ethnicity # 10k-20k 12 No High school Diploma 4
White 287 20k-30k 12 High School Diploma 22
Black 0 30k-40k 12 Some college 63
Alaskan Native 10 40k-50k 13 Associate degree 35
Asian 3 50k-60k 25 Professional certification 18
Pacific Islander 0 60k-70k 24 Bachelor's degree 107
Latino 3 70k-80k 36 Graduate degree 63
Two or more 11 80k-90k 29 Doctorate/PhD 21
Other 12 90k-100k 27 (blank) 55
(blank) 62 100k-110k 27 Grand Total 388
Grand Total 388 110k-120k 12 People in Household #
120k-130k 17 1 62
Gender # 130k-140k 20 2 149
Male 207 140k-150k 11 3 51
Female 127 150k+ 40 4 44
(blank) 54 (blank) 66 5 15
Grand Total 388 Grand Total 388 6 5




Table 2.18. Comparison of survey sociodemographic breakdown. Compares survey values with the state 
of Alaska and the US. Values are percentages to total population. Alaska and US values come from the 
US Census 2017 ACS Survey (US Census 2019).
Education Survey Alaska US
Less than High school 1.2% 7.6% 12.7%
High School Graduate W/O Bachelor's degree 41.4% 63.4% 56.4%
Bachelor's degree or higher 57.4% 29.0% 30.9%
Gender
Male 62.0% 52.1% 49.2%
Female 38.0% 47.9% 50.8%
Age
Less than 20 0.0% 27.6% 25.7%
20-30 2.1% 16.3% 14.0%
30-40 14.1% 14.2% 13.1%
40-50 18.6% 12.1% 12.8%
50-60 25.7% 13.8% 13.6%
60-70 28.4% 10.0% 11.0%
70-80 9.9% 4.1% 6.2%
80+ 1.2% 1.7% 3.7%
Annual Household Income
Less than $50k 16.77% 31.40% 43.90%
$50k-$100k 43.79% 32.40% 30.00%
$100k-$150k 27.02% 19.70% 14.10%
More than $150k 12.42% 16.50% 12.10%
Income information was collected from respondents in both boroughs. Since some risk mitigation 
actions can be costly, income could affect homeowner risk mitigation behavior. Income questions were 
asked categorically. With the use of household composition information, we created a variable that shows 
per capita household income. Table 2.19 shows contingency tables comparing income per household 
member, defensible space and taking any mitigation actions. In terms of defensible space, there was no 
significant differences in the way income affected a homeowner's defensible space (χ2 test p value = 
0.94). While at first glance this may seem to indicate no differences in actions from income, we should 
again point out that our sample was skewed in terms of income. Alaska's per capita income in 2017 was 
$34,222. There were 138 people who were below this threshold, but 193 above it. This means that higher 
income homeowners were more represented in this sample and may be affecting these results. Mitigation 
actions were similarly not affected by income (χ2 test p value = 0.97). Again, we need to acknowledge the 
role weighting plays into the income analysis.
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Table 2.19: Household income by defensible space and mitigation action. Contingency table of income, 
defensible space and whether the respondent took action.
Household income (per person)
Defensible space 2.5k-15k 15k-30k 30k-45k 45k and up Total
0-10ft 10 (38.5%) 22 (25.3%) 21 (28.4%) 37 (28.7%) 90 (28.5%)
10-30ft 10 (38.5%) 38 (43.7%) 26 (35.1%) 49 (38%) 123 (38.9%)
30-100ft 6 (23.1%) 27 (31%) 25 (33.8%) 40 (31%) 98 (31%)
100ft or more 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (2.7%) 3 (2.3%) 5 (1.6%)
Total 26 (100%)
Household income (per person)
87 (100%) 74 (100%) 129 (100%) 316 (100%)
Take mitigation actions? 2.5k-15k 15k-30k 30k-45k 45k and up Total
Yes 23 (88.5%) 76 (84.4%) 63 (84%) 109 (84.5%) 271 (84.7%)
No 3 (11.5%) 14 (15.6%) 12 (16%) 20 (15.5%) 49 (15.3%)
Total 26 (100%) 90 (100%) 75 (100%) 129 (100%) 320 (100%)
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Differences in Borough Responses
The differences between borough homeowner actions were varied. Defensible space around the home was 
one of the only significant differences between borough respondents. While FNSB residents were more 
likely to have larger defensible spaces, there were no other notable differences between boroughs. Both 
boroughs had similar issues with risk perception and had no difference in the specific actions they took. 
Neither borough showed evidence of free riding behavior, but both showed that neighbors' defensible 
space was correlated with their own. This indicates that in general, these WUI communities are similar to 
each other, but may also be representative of Alaskan WUI homeowners in general. The lack of 
differences between borough responses shows that the underlying population of homeowners in higher 
risk WUI locations may be the driving force behind responses. Differences between risk zones were 
similar to the differences between borough. Defensible space seems again to be dependent on homeowner 
risk zone, as those in extreme risk zones were more likely to clear more space around their house. Risk 
perception again seems to not be affected by objective risk zone and is linked toward homeowners in 
higher risk WUI locations in general. There were also slight differences in the way homeowners 
participated in risk reduction activities. These weren't very significant but did show that there may be 
some variances between the groups.
2.4.2 Mitigation Actions and Defensible Space
As previously shown in Table 2.9, wildfire risk mitigation actions were done by 84% of all 
respondents. While the actions were defined very broadly, this on its own would show that homeowners 
are aware of their objective wildfire risk, supporting the idea of proper self-identification of that risk.
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Table 2.2 also showed that there was a correlation between those in higher objective wildfire risk areas 
and those who kept a larger defensible space. This again indicates that homeowners are at least somewhat 
aware of general risk, or at least aware of differences in risk areas. However, when compared to actual 
defensible space responses, we can see drastic differences. Table 2.1 showed that almost 67% of survey 
respondents kept flammable fuels within 30 feet of their property. Table 2.10 also shows that only 32% of 
respondents regularly cleared leaves from their roofs, which is a low cost but highly effective tool to 
reduce ignition risk in the immediate zone (0-5 feet around the house) (National Fire Protection Agency - 
Firewise 2019). Given these reasons, the risk mitigation actions and defensible space/objective risk 
correlation may have an alternative explanation. If homeowners are working under the assumption that 
their activities are sufficient for their subjective risk area, then they can simultaneously take lots of action 
in general, recognize the need for more actions in higher objective risk zones, and still not be taking 
enough risk mitigation action. This can be seen both in the misidentification of risk (table 2.5) and the 
previously mentioned misalignment to standard Firewise compliance (National Fire Protection Agency - 
Firewise 2019). The negative correlation between living in the extreme objective wildfire risk zone and 
clearing your roof of leaves furthers this argument, as those homeowners should be most likely to take 
that mitigation action. The reduction of tree deaths from spruce bark beetles may have even more of an 
effect on those KPB respondents, furthering the perception of low wildfire risk.
The loss of the amenity value of natural landscapes may also explain some of this under provision 
of risk mitigation activity. If we assume that these respondents are underproviding risk reducing actions 
but are fully informed of their objective wildfire risk, they may be acting based on the total utility gained 
from that choice. Put differently, the individual benefit of reducing one's wildfire risk from reducing 
flammable fuels is not larger than lost benefit from losing the amenities provided by those fuels. Table 
2.13 highlights some evidence for this, as most respondents (62.9%) would be disincentivized to mitigate 
their wildfire risk if it also meant a loss of privacy. This is also supported by the fact that when asked 
directly, 84.0% of respondents would prefer land management agencies mechanically thin vegetation over 
a clear cutting (8.0%) or no action (8.0%). This shows a “best of both worlds” scenario where 
homeowners could take advantage of lowered risk while simultaneously keep much of the amenity values 
of the vegetation in the community. Also recall that the two risk reducing activities respondents most 
engaged in were pruning and/or trimming trees and/or bushes (60.5%) as well as cutting down dead or 
decaying trees (71.7%). This opens the possibility that homeowners have already taken all the risk 
reducing actions on their property they want while continuing to maximize their individual utility. This 
would then indicate a mismatch of incentives between individual homeowners, individual WUI 
communities, and the land management agencies suppressing and pre-suppressing wildfire.
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2.4.3 Policy Implications
In Alaskan WUI areas, the policy implications of the survey responses should be seen in three 
different ways. The first is under the presumption of cost effectiveness of public spending. For example, 
shaded fuel treatments were the preferred type of treatment on publicly owned lands, but they may be 
twice as costly as cleared fuel breaks. Fuel breaks need to be examined in the framework of cost per acre 
to implement, and amount saved from assumed reductions to economic loss from wildfires (Agee 2000). 
Furthermore, the costs of thinned fuel treatments can be as much a $8,0008 per acre in Alaska (St. Clair 
2006). If cost effectiveness is not met when implementing the preferred mitigation strategy on public 
lands, homeowner preferences may be balanced by a payment mechanism to offset costs. This would 
require estimates for willingness-to-pay, and a broad understanding of covariates affecting these 
preferences. While a direct method of payment was most preferred, this is likely the least cost-effective 
method of risk reduction and would require further analysis of homeowner willingness-to-accept. The 
second policy implication is the benefit of neighborhood participation and information sharing. The 
hazard literature is consistent when discussing the benefits that education programs and social interaction 
give in risk management (Paton et al. 2008, Pearce 2003, Cutter et al. 2008). A focus on these types of 
benefits may provide a relatively cost-effective means to reduce community level wildfire risk by 
incentivizing mitigation actions. Risk perception issues were common in both study areas, so 
communication between Alaskan boroughs with high wildfire risk may be beneficial to all Alaskan WUI 
communities. Leveraging a community's built in resilience to risk mitigation may not only be the 
preferred method but be much less costly than mechanical thinning of public lands. The third and last way 
to approach this would be to remember the spatial context of wildfire risk mitigation actions. There was 
anecdotal evidence that losing shade and the dangers of thawing permafrost was a key factor in risk 
mitigation decision making. This was seen directly in question responses (Table 2.13), as was the 
potential of lost amenity values of privacy giving landscape. When planning community wide projects to 
reduce wildfire risk, keep in mind the complex decision making that individual homeowners perform as 
well as their wide-ranging spatial preferences. Future research should include follow-up surveys to test 
longitudinal changes associated with taking risk mitigation actions. Because dichotomous choice 
questions were asked, logit models can be utilized to estimate the factors that affect the probability of 
action. This sort of analysis should take care to not omit critical variables, as this sort of bias could lead to 
incorrect interpretation.
8 In 2019 dollars
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2.4.4 Sources of Bias
There are a few potential sources of bias based on the sample of survey respondents. The first to 
consider is participation bias based on our response rate. Approximately one in five Alaskan residents 
sampled participated in the survey. Because of this, we cannot assume that the remaining residents that 
did not participate would answer similarly to those who chose to participate. If non respondents are 
thought to be fundamentally different in the context of wildfire risk, this could lead to bias in the results 
presented. The shifts in sociodemographic variables may also bias our results, if we assume that those 
groups answer questions differently based on their group alone. For example, those with higher incomes 
may be able to clear a larger defensible space than those with lower incomes. While a small number of 
tests showed that there was little difference in the way different sociodemographic groups9 answered 
certain questions, this sort of analysis would have to be question and sociodemographic group specific. 
As mentioned, preliminary testing did not show that this was systematically present across responses and 
within sociodemographic groups. Social desirability bias may also influence the responses received. The 
survey presented the concepts of Firewise compliance and defensible space as positive and contributing to 
community risk reduction. If a respondent felt compelled to answer questions in a way that makes them 
be viewed in a more positive light, this would lead to upward bias in these types of questions. The free 
riding conclusions drawn from the defensible space questions may be especially vulnerable to this type of 
bias, as homeowners may be reluctant to admit a neighbor having more defensible space than them. The 
fundamental argument for this type of bias would be the ubiquity of Firewise compliance and defensible 
space as socially positive, which may not actually be the case.
9 Specifically, gender and education level.
2.5 Conclusion
Both Alaskan boroughs surveyed were seen to respond in very similar ways, with the notable 
exception being defensible space. Even across objective wildfire risk, there were trends within responses. 
There was evidence of individual misidentification of objective wildfire risk, as well as under-provision 
of actions taken based on self-identified neighborhood wildfire risk. This confirms much of the previous 
literature of WUI communities in the contiguous United States. Informational campaigns on the aggregate 
effects of community wide risk reduction activities by homeowners may increase participation rates. For 
those homeowners that were fully informed, amenity values were a significant factor in individual 
decision making. The loss of privacy and shade were among the most important benefits of not reducing 
fuels. While there was a significant amount of some mitigation actions being taken, it wasn't at the level 
necessary for risk reduction commensurate with objective risk. Proper defensible space was lacking, as 
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were actions taken in the closest zone to the home, such as the removal of vegetation from roofs and the 
installation of nonflammable house siding. The most preferred direct incentive for increased participation 
in risk reducing activities were in the form of direct payments (subsidies, discounts etc.). Adaptive 
capacity building in the form of community wide participation and involvement was also preferred. 
Finally, there was little evidence of free-riding behavior based on the community wide defensible space 
self-assessments done by respondents. Future research should include a longitudinal component for 
follow-ups. When mixed with external factors, they can provide insight into how preferences have 
changed over time. For example, the 2019 Shovel Creek fire north west of Fairbanks forced evacuations 
in an area we previously surveyed. Subsequent surveys should focus on this community, as the recent 
exposure will presumably shift their preferences.
Alaskan WUI communities are vulnerable. Like many other wildfire prone regions, they often 
balance the comfort and beauty of living in semi-open wildlands with the increased risk from probabilistic 
wildfire events. There are many options available to WUI homeowners to reduce both home ignition risk, 
and the probability their property will ignite when a wildfire approaches. However, many variables 
ultimately determine the observable homeowner action (or inaction) and are governed by multifaceted 
preferences and constraints. Examining the human dimensions of wildfire risk is crucial for those 
attempting to increase neighborhood resilience to these hazards. Public agencies can use this information 
to make the most informed and cost-effective means to achieve neighborhood risk goals in high risk WUI 
communities. As with many other hazards, we must fully understand the threat before we can 
appropriately fight against it.
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Chapter 3 Homeowner Preferences of Wildfire Risk Mitigation in the Alaskan Wildland Urban Interface - 
Choice Experiment Results1
1 This chapter is currently being prepared externally for academic journal publication. Other authors on that 
manuscript include Joseph Little (University of Alaska Fairbanks), Stacy Drury (USDA - US Forest Service), Randi 
Jandt (University of Alaska Fairbanks) and Brock Lane (University of Alaska Fairbanks).
Abstract
Naturally occurring wildfire has become a larger threat to human life and property with the 
proliferation of homes into the wildland urban interface. The state of Alaska has a unique challenge in 
that wildland urban interface communities are abundant and close to large expanses of dense 
flammable fuels. The removal of these fuels, both on private and public lands has been shown to 
reduce wildfire risk in these locations. However, incentivizing private land mitigation is potentially 
problematic. Homeowner preferences for wildfire risk mitigation in the wildland urban interface is 
explored via discreet choice experiment to better understand the drivers of their risk mitigation 
actions. Hierarchical Bayesian analysis provides willingness-to-pay estimates of mitigation cost, 
public land treatments, neighbor actions and total risk reduction. Willingness-to-pay estimates for 
wildfire risk reduction were large (>$1000) for all respondents. Even larger willingness-to-pay 
estimates were seen in respondents who self-identified as subjectively being a high risk for wildfire, 
as well as significantly lower willingness-to-pay for respondents who self-identified as having 
subjectively lower wildfire risk. Willingness-to-pay estimates also showed a homeowner preference 
for thinned, or shaded fuel treatments on public lands, preferring them to cleared treatments. These 
cleared fuel treatments were least preferred, even less so than having no public land fuel treatment. 
Future research questions should include a look into the preference of shaded fuel breaks as a 
reflection of amenity values or of the protection of Alaskan permafrost.
3.1 Introduction
The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) has been the focus of many studies examining the effects of 
wildfire on residents and the general economic losses of homeowner property and communities (Holmes 
et al. 2009, Hammer et al. 2009, Stein et al. 2013). WUI areas are particularly vulnerable to wildfire, 
since they are directly adjacent to open wildlands. Probabilistic fire events occurring in open wildlands 
close to WUI communities may give residents very little time to react. Individuals in these communities 
only have direct control over the fuels on their own property, and not external activities that reduce 
wildfire ignition and spread outside of their property lines. Even so, homeowners can still make decisions 
that affect wildfire risk in their neighborhood, and house ignition probabilities from within their own 
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property lines. It has been shown that the effort put into pre-suppression tactics mitigates the impacts 
from wildfire spread, and therefore overall suppression costs (Lankoande and Yoder 2006). Because these 
risk mitigation activities are an important component to suppressing wildfire in WUI communities, 
programs such as Firewise (National Fire Protection Agency - Firewise 2019) help build community 
resilience to wildfire via education and the building of social support networks. Since wildfire 
suppression agents rely so much on the pre-suppression activities of individual private homeowners, our 
interests lie in understanding the motivations of these homeowners to take part in their own risk 
mitigation activities. We used a discreet choice experiment (DCE) to estimate an Alaskan homeowner's 
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for general wildfire risk reduction both on their own property and 
surrounding public lands.
3.1.1 Alaskan Perspective on Wildfire
The state of Alaska must deal with wildfire in a unique way. The size of the state combined with 
the low population densities make wildfire suppression decisions different than in other areas of the 
country. Large, thousand-acre fires are sometimes left to burn while only being monitored, since they 
pose no threat to human safety or significant economic loss (Alaska Department of Natural Resources: 
Division of Forestry 2019). The low population densities also create large WUI areas across the state. 
Many Alaskans in these WUI locations are at significantly higher risk than those in more densely 
populated areas. Mitigation activities done on private lands can provide benefits both to individual 
homeowners, and to entire WUI communities in the form of shared risk reduction. Addressing wildfire 
risk is an important policy issue, as land management agencies have been slow to respond to the changing 
climate and ecology in WUI locations (Dombeck et al. 2004). If state and federal agencies are to find 
ways to properly incentivize homeowners to reduce fuels on their own property, they must understand 
how homeowners value this wildfire risk reduction. Specifically, they need to identify the value 
homeowners place on their own mitigation actions, the level of aggregate neighborhood mitigation 
activity, and the level of land management agency (LMA) participation. These values could then create 
the primer for future discussion of wildfire mitigation incentivization programs.
Alaska depends on defining zones to trigger wildfire suppression response. They group all areas 
of the state into four suppression response zones (Alaska Department of Natural Resources: Division of 
Forestry 2019). Critical protection zones necessitate immediate suppression and usually are close to larger 
urban areas, placing people and property in direct and imminent danger. Full protection areas may still 
require a strong response, though the risk to human life is reduced. Modified protection areas do not 
require the same level of response as full protection, with the limited zone triggering the least suppression 
response. From 2007-2015, there have been approximately 173 wildfires that were larger than 50 acres in 
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critical and full protection zones threatening 4733 structures and burning down 169. Most of this 
structural threat came from three fires, the Caribou Hills fire in 2007, the Hastings fire in 2011 and the 
Sockeye fire in 2015. In 2015 there were over 5.1 million acres burned in the state, causing widespread 
smoke and poor visibility for almost all Alaskan residents. From a cost perspective, the Funny River fire 
in 2014 had a suppression cost of approximately $11.5 million dollars. The Hastings and Sockeye fires 
also had high2 suppression costs of approximately $18.5 million and $8 million respectively. The Shovel 
Creek fire in 2019 had a preliminary cost estimated over $25 million dollars. The costs associated with 
wildfire suppression will continue to rise in the face of warming temperatures and WUI proliferation. 
Estimates of future suppression costs are expected to be over one billion dollars over the next century, 
averaging $60 million per year (Melvin et al. 2017). Figure 3.1 shows the spatial distribution of all 
wildfire ignition points in the state from 2007-2015.
2 These costs are considered low compared to large wildfire costs in many parts of the contiguous United States, but 
from both a per capita and budgetary perspective, these costs have the potential to disproportionality impact Alaskan 
spending.
Figure 3.1: Total number of wildfires in Alaska from 2007 to 2015. Points are ignition locations for each 
wildfire and are not to scale.
In order to most appropriately assess risk and apply spatially oriented pre-suppression actions, 
Alaskan communities of varying wildfire risk are defined by their respective Community Wildfire 
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Protection Plan (CWPP). These CWPPs give exact boundaries for areas where this risk is higher than 
others and are usually created for individual boroughs. In the Fairbanks North Star Borough, there are 
three risk zones: high risk, very high risk, and extreme risk. These zone boundaries are often defined by 
hazardous fuels and topographical features and are spread out across the landscape. The Kenai Peninsula 
Borough defines four risk areas: low, moderate, high and extreme risk. While these zones do not exactly 
line up with the zones defined by the Fairbanks North Star Borough, there are clear similarities on the 
higher risk side. When comparing the two CWPP risk zones in the survey, the top three levels of each are 
considered equivalent3. These risk zones are also considered the objective risk indicators for a 
neighborhood. Figures for both the FNSB and KPB zones of concern are shown in figures 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively.
3 FNSB ‘high' is equivalent to Kenai ‘moderate', FNSB ‘very high' is equivalent to Kenai ‘high', and FNSB 
‘extreme' is equivalent to Kenai ‘extreme'.
Figure 3.2: Objective risk zones in the Fairbanks-North Star Borough. Areas in yellow are in high risk, 
orange are in very high risk, and red are in extreme risk.
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Figure 3.3: Objective risk zones in the Kenai Peninsula Borough. Legend seen below and includes four 
risk areas, low, moderate, high and extreme risk (Kenai Peninsula Borough 2019)
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3.1.2 Under Provision of Wildfire Risk Mitigation
Wildfire mitigation actions are generally underprovided by homeowners in WUI communities 
(Brenkert-Smith et al. 2006). Pre-suppression4 activities have been shown to be underutilized and 
marginally more cost effective than direct suppression actions when fighting wildfire (Lankoande and 
Yoder 2006). The natural question to answer then is why homeowners underprovide these services, given 
they directly benefit them. In a WUI context, there is a diverse array of land ownership that make wildfire 
risk mitigation actions more difficult to manage in the aggregate. Spatially, homeowners who are closer to 
the open wildland will get the brunt of the damages. It has been shown via simulation that neighborhoods 
with a buffer strategy5 to home ignition risk mitigation stop the spread of wildfire through the 
neighborhoods faster than more spread-out mitigation (Butry and Donovan, 2008). This could potentially 
create an incentive for homeowners who are further away from the frontlines to free-ride and get indirect 
wildfire risk reductions without reducing flammable fuels on their own lands. There is also a direct link 
between the attitudes of people living in WUI locations and the value of the homes. Mitigation activities 
are seen less in renters, and dwelling cash value is highly motivating at the homeowner level (Collins 
2008).
4 Defined to be costs associated with planning, prevention, detection equipment, and other similar costs.
5 Defined to be a spatial arrangement of fuel reduction that focuses on the contact boundary between open wildlands 
and a WUI community.
Amenity and privacy values have been shown to drive the under provision of homeowner wildfire 
risk mitigation actions (Kobayashi et al. 2010, Paveglio et al. 2016). WUI residents are often reluctant to 
change the landscaping on their property until wildfire is eminent (Brenkert-Smith et al. 2006). This is 
also shown in a lower WTP for mitigation actions from homeowners on their own property than for 
public mitigation actions (Holmes et al. 2009). In an experimental setting, there is evidence of a 
‘crowding out' phenomena where individual homeowners react to increased (or potential increases to) 
public mitigation activities with lowered mitigation spending, even though there were higher participation 
rates (Prante et al 2011, Talberth et al. 2006). There is also a belief that protection from wildfire will 
come in the form of government suppression agencies. A study by Vogt, Winter and Fried (2002) found 
that trust in the government to protect private property from wildfire was significantly positive. 
Furthermore, the perception of wildfire risk can drive behavior more than actual wildfire risk. 
Homeowners often underestimate the true risk levels in their neighborhood, as education initiatives were 
positively associated with higher rates of homeowner fuel mitigation (Brenkert-Smith et al. 2012). This 
increased risk information has also been shown to specifically drive mitigation behavior, even more than 
past wildfire experience (Martin et al. 2009). Even while acknowledging that education increases risk 
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mitigation activities, government programs must combat inadequate funding for education-based wildfire 
programs (Reams et al. 2005). The benefit of reducing wildfire risk by participating in mitigation 
activities is clear, but these explanations may explain why not enough is being done in many WUI 
communities. The potential reasons behind the under provision of wildfire mitigation actions were 
considered while constructing the survey instrument and choice experiment and are reflected in the 
questions asked.
3.1.3 Homeowner Participation in Mitigation Actions
Homeowners have been shown to participate in wildfire mitigation activities under a variety of 
circumstances. Even when fully insured, homeowners in WUI communities had significant WTP for 
wildfire risk reduction via pre-suppression activities (Talberth et al. 2006). While insurance can protect 
individual homeowners mitigate loss, these protections rarely cover all loses (Winter and Fried 2001). 
This may seem to contradict earlier comments regarding renters and low cash value homes, since those 
findings indicate that actions stem from direct economic loss. The idea of non-market losses due to 
wildfire seem to fill this gap, as they are not protected by insurance policies. WTP estimates for risk 
reduction via wildfire risk mitigation actions have been attempted in the past. A Contingent Valuation 
(CV) study estimated a significant WTP in a theoretical market for 50% risk reduction via risk reducing 
activities (Winter and Fried 2001). WTP for risk reduction via mitigation activities has also been 
estimated for homeowners from three US states (California, Montana and Florida) in a different CV study 
(Loomis and Gonzalez-Caban 2008). These estimates were found to be significant and positive, ranging 
from $190 to $500 depending on the individual and location. While useful, CV studies have recently 
faced significant criticism. First, the cost parameter is sensitive to the monetary scale initially outlined by 
researchers in a referendum style CV survey. This leads to suggestive prompts on the value of the 
environmental good in question. Secondly, and most importantly, was their inability to capture the true 
scope of the environmental loss being avoided (McFadden and Train 2017). Because of this, we need to 
identify a different approach to estimating WTP that minimizes the difficulties found in CV models. 
Mixed logit models have been used to assess WUI homeowner wildfire risk reduction preferences in the 
past (Holmes et al. 2009). Using a stratified random sample of low, medium and high wildfire risk areas, 
their WTP estimates showed that WUI homeowners in high risk areas were willing to pay more for public 
wildfire mitigation programs, over their own fuel reduction. Sociodemographic values could identify 
population segments most in need of financial assistance for mitigation activities that were out of their 
financial reach. While this study was done in Florida, it may have implications to how much homeowners 
are willing to pay in similar landscapes and demographics around the country. However, the 
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distinctiveness of Alaskan populations and landscape are suitable for a unique study that fully 
incorporates the distinctiveness of the state.
Social norms also play a role in how homeowners in WUI areas opt into wildfire risk mitigation 
activities. Expert analysis of a community's wildfire risk (in the form of a CWPP) is often assumed to be 
the strongest indicator of risk and risk mitigation information in WUI locations. However, there is 
evidence that suggests perceptions of risk are affected by informal and non-expert information gained by 
other community members (Brenkert-Smith et al. 2013). Both a “sense of community” and “community 
problem solving” were also identified as a resource to increase mitigation activities on homeowner 
property (Prior and Eriksen 2013). In this vein, social capital is also positively associated with 
participation in community wildfire programs (Agrawal and Monroe 2006). In terms of WTP, there 
should be a larger WTP for more neighborhood participation in communities with large amounts of social 
capital, and for those in the community that are aware of the wildfire risk. Any deviation from this would 
suggest other factors outweigh this social component.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Random Utility Model
Discreet choice experiments are a key tool to evaluate the value of nonmarket goods by focusing 
on a type of stated preference valuation. This is done by estimating the values of individual levels of 
nonmarket good attributes. By getting these values, we can ascribe overall values to packages of the 
nonmarket good as they would be seen in the real world. The analysis of discreet choice experiments 
relies heavily on a Random Utility Model (RUM). Like most applied models, RUMs usually require a set 
number of assumptions for the results to have any meaning.
The first assumption is that the choices made in the experiment are discreet events that have real 
world applicability. The respondent chooses between discreet states as designed in the experiment, and 
not partial, or continuous states. This assumption is met by virtue of the experimental design. The second 
assumption, and most fundamental, is that all respondents are rational and their choices will always 
reflect that. Specifically, the model assumes that individual choices are based on the highest utility gain 
(people are rational utility maximizers). This not only applies to direct utility gains, but also in scenarios 
in which respondents are minimizing potential loses in the face of uncertainty, in this case, wildfire. This 
assumption also relies on perfect information to inform rational decision making. In the aggregate, there 
is the possibility of later choices being affected by non-utility-maximizing behavior if the cognitive 
burden of the experiment is too large for respondents (straight lining). This issue is primarily addressed 
by never requiring a response for any portion of the survey and allowing respondents to quit the survey at 
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The total utility of respondent i given by alternative j (defined as Uij) is comprised of a deterministic 
component (defined as Vij), and the random component (defined as eij). The variable Vij is the utility 
driven by exogenous variables in the alternative j. The deterministic portion could potentially drive the 
total utility in the face of this perfect information scenario. However, since that rarely happens, we need 
to look closely at the random component of utility. This utility ultimately drives the overall utility, since 
the exogenous variables do not affect it, while affecting all respondent's utility identically. When a 
respondent decides between allowable choice sets, there may be underlying attraction towards one 
attribute level or another that isn't based on the deterministic utility. The random component of utility eij 
is assumed to have a normal distribution in the population. Furthermore, each individual's random utility 
is also assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) for each alternative. In other words, 
the random component is identically normal across all alternatives, and is independent of other random 
utilities.
where β is our preference parameter. In a normal logit model, this parameter would be aggregated. 
However, in a mixed logit model, we allow for this preference parameter to have a different value for 
each individual, allowing for individual stochastic utility values. We can further define this utility in 
terms of the cost involved in making that choice: 
where α is the cost parameter (which should be unequivocally negative).
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any time. While theoretical scenarios will always lack a direct commitment from the respondent, choice 
experiments using RUMs are easier to answer and produce better estimates when compared to CV studies 
(McFadden and Train 2017).
The last assumption relates to the random component of a respondent's utility. We define this 
random utility in term of total utility as seen in equation 1.
3.2.2 Mixed Logit Model
The focus now becomes estimating the utilities laid out in the previous section. One approach is 
the mixed logit model (Hensher Greene 2003). Starting from our definition of a RUM, we can break out 
the deterministic component of utility as such:
The likelihood that a person with a given βi chooses an alternative j is given by a standard logit
formula:
The same will be true when estimating our cost parameter α. Once these parameters are estimated, a 
simple quotient give us our WTP estimates for all xij.
Traditional logit models suffer from the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Because of the 
way logit predicts probabilities, it often predicts them poorly when other possibilities are added, cross­
elasticities aren't equal, or when the substitution of choices is not perfect. The fundamental problem is 
how logit models handle the random terms. These are assumed to be independent from each other, which 
can be an incorrect assumption to make. However, a mixed logit model allows for correlated random 
terms which resolves our IIA problem.
3.2.3 Hierarchical Bayes Estimation
Hierarchical Bayes (HB) estimation6 will be used to calculate the final marginal utility of choice 
variable attribute levels. The fundamental idea behind HB is the same as any Bayesian approach; Bayes' 
theorem.
6 All material referenced in the Bayesian approach is listed here: (Sawtooth 2016) (Orme 2000) (Johnson 2000)
Our parameter β is the probability of a specific level of an attribute being chosen, and y is the information 
gained by respondent answers (data). This means that the probability in question can be summarized as 
the probability of β occurring conditional on the data y. The probability P(β) is defined as our prior 
distribution of β (the probability of β before any new information y), P (y) is the distribution of y 
occurring (the normalizing distribution or the evidence), and P(y∣β) as our likelihood distribution (the 
probability y occurring given β occurs). However, by itself, Bayes' theorem doesn't have the capacity to 
deal these distributions being variable, often based on latent variables. It also doesn't include a higher 
order assumption that these choices may also be described by a multivariate normal distribution. This 
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requires the use of a multi-level analysis of the individual's parameters, which requires a slightly different 
approach.
HB models implement the use of hyperparameters, and hyperprior distributions. Put simply, the 
hyperparameter is the highest level of a parameter of the prior distribution, while the hyperprior is the 
specific distribution of this hyperparameter. Using these, the following framework can be constructed to 
provide posterior distributions. If we assume that β has a distribution governed by a hyperparameter φ, 
then we can define the following stages in estimating our posterior.
Stage I: yj ∣ βj, φ ~ P(yj∙ ∣ βj, φ) [the likelihood of yj occurring given βj (which has a hyperparameter of 
φ) has a probability given those values.]
Stage II: βj ∣ φ ~ P(βj ∣ φ) [the likelihood of βj occurring given the hyperparameter φ has a probability 
given those values.]
Stage III: φ ~ P (φ) [the likelihood of φ being our distribution hyperparameter is given by the a priori 
probability of φ]
Using Bayes' theorem, and the definition of conditional probability, we can show that in general: 
P(φ,βj∣yj) ∝ P(yj∣ βj)P(βj,φ) 
and this leads to our 2-stage hierarchical model where our posterior distribution is: 
or non-normalized as:
Practically speaking, HB estimation of utilities is an iterative process. It needs to consistently add in 
previous estimates for β in order to come up with better and better utility estimates. Using the principles 
of Monte Carlo Markov Chain iterations, it allows for other βs to be “borrowed” from other respondents 
as another reference point to cover the issues of random preferences and their distributions. While this can 
create a heavy computational load problem, it allows for better estimation of utility parameters by 
partially pooling responses.
3.2.4 Choice Experiment Design
The RUM assumptions highlight the requirement of sound choice experiment design. Because 
there is always a random component to a respondent's utility, the requirement for a full factorial design 
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may seem necessary. Even though a full factorial design may be seen as a requirement from the 
standpoint of our RUM assumptions, we can make statistically sound changes to the design without 
losing optimality. Minimizing the determinant of the variance matrix7 leads to D-optimality, ensuring the 
same effectiveness of a full factorial design with less choice sets. This kind of optimal design becomes a 
larger and larger necessity due to the nature of the total number of the choice sets. As the total number of 
attributes increases, the total number of choice sets increases exponentially. This is clearly unrealistic, as 
the homeowner survey instrument would have needed respondents to view 405 individual choice sets 
(34∙5) for a full factorial design.
7 Or conversely, maximizing the determinant of the fisher information matrix.
8 From Sawtooth Software's help file: ‘The [survey design] algorithm cannot be said to produce optimal designs, but 
its designs are near-orthogonal, and have proven to work exceptionally well in many methodological studies to date 
comparing ACBC to standard CBC [predefined D-optimal designs].'
Using an adaptive based approach to survey design requires looking at the random utility 
assumption differently. While before it was necessary to have a D-Optimal design to deal with the 
random utility, the survey software implements a different technique to insure near optimal choice 
design8. By explicitly asking for favored attribute levels, and discerning unacceptable and required 
attribute levels, the software can create choice sets of near neighbors while including the normal full 
range of attribute levels in choice sets. These choices also help inform the hyperparameters in the 
estimation process. This allows a design that is created while the respondent is actively taking the survey 
and is customized individually.
Analysis of the choice experiment allows for estimates of utility, and ultimately WTP to be 
calculated for each of the variables and their levels. The choice experiment asked respondents to choose 
between different risk reducing scenarios that included five variables with a varying number of attribute 
levels. Table 3.1 shows the variables selected and their respective levels used in the choice experiment. 
These variables allowed for choice sets that included a wide range of options, including no costs options, 
no risk reduction options, and high cost, high risk reduction options. These scenarios also included land 
management agency involvement, as well as the involvement from neighbors. There is a complex array of 
variables that influence behavior, so it is important to try and identify the strongest indicators of behavior 
and attempt to estimate the utility of those factors. This specific configuration of choice variables and 
levels will also allow for the analysis of altruistic and free riding choice behavior.
As mentioned before, much of the statistical survey design is done by the survey software as the 
homeowner proceeds through the experiment. Specifically, the three sections of the adaptive choice based 
conjoint (ACBC) were the “Build your own” (BYO) sections, screener questions, and the choice 
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tournament (choice tasks). The BYO section consists of a single screen where all variables and their 
respective attributes are listed. The screener portion, typically consisting of 6-8 screens is the main tool to 
whittle down the overall choice sets shown to the respondent. It picks out attribute levels that are more 
desirable than others. When effectively implemented, these screens reduce the choice sets seen in the 
choice tournament. Respondents typically saw 6 sets (pages) of 3 choices in the choice tournament, 
totaling 18 possible combinations. Being able to reduce the total number of pages a respondent sees while 
keeping statistical efficiency is the most vital improvements to the adaptive choice experiment. The 
reduction in pages seen helps to keep the cognitive burden low for a survey of this type. Since this survey 
was going out to a wide range of potential respondents, the length and difficulty of the survey was a 
constant area of examination. The total time required to take the survey was estimated to be 30-45 
minutes. The survey took advantage of the efficiencies in design in order to achieve those times.
3.2.5 Sample Selection
Sound sample selection practices produce the best statistical inferencing when making claims on 
population behavior. The goal is to feel confident that the sample statistics are unbiased estimates of the 
population parameters in question. One way to increase the chances of that occurring is to increase our 
overall sample, and make sure our sample is an accurate representation of the population.9 Homeowners 
invited to participate in the survey had to fit several criteria. First, the homeowner needed to live in an 
area of wildfire risk. Their risk zone, as defined from the CWPP, was noted in their contact letter and in 
the online survey. Second, since all information about homeowners came from the borough tax database, 
homeowners needed to have paid taxes on their property. Lastly, the mailing address on file needed to 
match up with the homeowner's actual mailing address. Any old or outdated information from the 
respective boroughs made the homeowner of that parcel inaccessible. Once the eligible homeowners were 
pooled, 1,000 homeowners were randomly selected from each borough (FNSB and KBP). This 1000 
homeowner sample was pulled from each borough's wildfire risk population. After the initial contact (via 
physical letter), homeowners self-selected into the sample by choosing to take the online survey. After 
multiple follow-ups, a total of 38810 homeowners participated in the survey (A response rate of 19.4%). 
This total sample size is sufficient for proper statistical inferencing.
9 Increasing the sample size has numerous benefits, including reducing the overall variance of the sample, and a 
simplification of the underlying distribution assumptions, therefore improving statistical tests based on those 
distributions.
10 Certain portions of the survey had higher response rates due to the optional nature of the survey questions.
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3.2.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Population Sample
Descriptive statistics of survey respondents for age, education level and income were tabulated 
for each of the fire risk levels (Tables 3.2-3.4). In terms of age, the single largest age group within a risk 
level was 60 to 69-year-olds in the ‘High' risk area (35.6%). Most respondents fell into the 50 to 59 or 60 
to 69-year-old categories for age. Income and education values are assumed to be correlated since higher 
levels of education should lead to higher income levels. In all risk areas, 57.4% of respondents had at 
least a bachelor's degree. The same trend follows when looking across the different risk zones. The only 
outlier seems to be a slightly larger upward shift to education levels in the ‘High' risk fire zones. When 
asked about wildfire mitigation activities (Table 3.5), 84% of all respondents indicated that they had 
pursued at least one mitigation activity on their property. The set of mitigation activities was defined 
broadly. Actions like clearing a yard of leaf litter, keeping long grasses trimmed, or pruning trees were 
considered wildfire-mitigating activities (Table 3.6). Responses to mitigation activity questions were 
incorporated into section III of the Alaska Wildfire Coordinating Group Wildfire Risk Rating for Homes 
in the Wildland Urban Interface spreadsheet. In terms of structure preparedness (Table 3.7), respondents 
from both regions fell in the ‘moderate' category. Breaking down responses across wildfire risk showed 
that those in the ‘Very High' risk zones were the most likely to have taken risk mitigation action, with 
87.2% having done some mitigation action. The other risk zones (‘High' and ‘Extreme') still had ‘Yes' 
responses above 80%, which was shown to be statistically equivalent (ANOVA p value=0.413).
If the respondent indicated that they had done some mitigation activities, they were asked to 
specify their level of involvement (Table 3.6). Only a small percentage of respondents had installed non­
combustible materials to the exterior of their home. Fire resistant siding has the lowest selection rate, with 
only 6.9% of respondents indicating they have installed it in their homes. The next two lowest were 
related to roof upgrades, with only 11.7% installing screening over roof vents and 13.1% installing a 
chimney spark arrester. Instead, this section was dominated by the vegetation options. 71.7% of 
respondents indicated that they cut down dead or decaying trees from their properties. The next two 
highest responses came from pruning and trimming trees and bushes (60.5% of respondents) as well as 
regularly clearing the first 10 feet of land around their home of light brush (54.5% of respondents). The 
most direct explanation for this discrepancy in activity type is the fundamental reasoning behind these 
homeowner activities. The installation of fire-resistant materials on someone's home only provides one 
service to the homeowner, which is reducing the ignition probability to the home in the event of an 
external fire. Vegetative removal options however can provide other services to the homeowner. The 
amenity values associated with pruned and cut vegetation may often outweigh the fire mitigation values 
associated with these activities (Paveglio et al. 2016). The large initial values for mitigation activity may 
just reflect amenity values and not activities based on wildfire risk reduction. Care should also be taken 
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when comparing these two activities, as there are significant price and time11 differences in these types of 
mitigation actions.
11 Time differences include both the frequency of the activity, as well as the durability of the home materials.
Keeping a defensible space around a home is a key component in protecting homes from wildfire 
risk. This includes keeping flammable fuel sources, and unmaintained vegetation away from the structure, 
and preferably, at least 100ft away from the home. Most respondents indicated that they kept fuel sources 
relatively close to their home (Table 3.8). These values change a bit when looking at the risk breakdowns, 
as those in the ‘Extreme' fire risk zone tended to keep unmaintained vegetation further away than those in 
relatively lower risk areas. When directly asked how land management agencies should reduce hazardous 
fuels from public lands in the area, the responses were dominated by mechanical thinning to create shaded 
fuel breaks (Table 3.9). In terms of wildfire mitigation, removing more fuel is more beneficial in terms of 
increasing changes to wildfire behavior. However, this seems to be a secondary consideration when 
viewed from the perspective of the survey respondents. Across risk areas, there wasn't much variation in 
this preference. There was a slight decrease to the percentage of people who preferred mechanical 
thinning as risk increased. Because thinned fuel treatments are much more expensive than cleared fuel 
breaks, this high level of preference may only indicate the desire for more valuable landscaping options, 
as the respondents are not making any economic tradeoffs for the mitigation action. This will be directly 
addressed when discussing choice experiment results.
3.3 Choice Experiment Results and Discussion
The results for all WTP estimates are shown in Tables 3.10a-3.10c. Based on responses to survey 
questions, as well as geographic location and sociodemographic data, WTP estimates changed based on 
the inferred qualities of those interactions.
3.3.1 All Respondents
Using all respondents (n=358) to the choice experiment, WTP estimates are a baseline for all 
other group interactions. These estimates represent all Alaskan households who completed the survey, 
making no distinction to location or other demographic information. These respondents have preferences 
that are generally reflective of behaviors identified in other studies (Brenkert Smith et al. 2006). 
Specifically, that amenity values and social norms of contribution are acknowledged. The number of 
neighbors mitigating (neigh0, neigh1-4, neigh5+) their own property was significant and show preference 
for mitigation. While neighbor mitigation was beneficial for adjacent landowners from a risk perspective, 
too much of this activity was less preferred, as seen in the smaller WTP estimates for (neigh5+). WTP 11
53
estimates are similar for (neigh0) and (neigh5+), suggesting that this middle ground provides some 
protection, while keeping some of the inherent value from flammable fuels. While this potentially goes 
against a social norm argument, it may merely indicate that individual level amenity-based incentives 
may outweigh the social component in the aggregate.
Public lands in WUI communities may provide amenity values to residents but may also provide 
wildfire risk mitigation when properly treated. While this public land could be managed under a myopic 
risk mitigation perspective, the preferences of nearby residents are crucial to building cooperative 
management decisions. Even when preferences do not align perfectly between homeowners and land 
management agencies, this input can provide information to help land managers better understand the 
impacts of their decisions. Both thinned and clear-cut fuel treatments have been shown to beneficially 
change wildfire behavior in modelling settings (Little et al. 2018). However, for the Alaskan residents 
surveyed, the type of mitigation done on nearby public lands showed no ordinal value based on WTP 
estimates. There is a very strong preference for thinned (thin) fuel treatments, over clear cut (clear), or 
even no mitigation (nomit). This indicates that respondents would rather have the increased risk of 
flammable fuels on nearby lands, than have flammable fuels completely removed in portions of those 
lands. Alternatively, homeowners would rather produce this risk reduction themselves (at the WTP cost) 
then have the risk reduction come from the form of reduced fuels. One anecdotal explanation for this is 
the presence of permafrost soils in Alaska. These soils are perpetually frozen and provide stability to 
structures built on top of them. If these soils are then exposed to direct sunlight from clear cutting, they 
may change the structural dynamic in the surrounding area. Homeowners have more control over the way 
they reduce fuels on their own land, so this may be preferable. Another explanation is that the amenity 
values lost from clear cutting are valued higher than the expected risk reduction to the homeowners. This 
can be seen by the much larger WTP estimates for (nomit) over (clear)12. Thinned fuel treatments (thin) 
were the clear preference for homeowners, providing both some level of amenity value and permafrost 
protection. While the higher WTP for thinned fuel treatments were apparent, these values may or may not 
converge with the much higher increased costs of these treatments, which can reach $8,000 per acre in 
Alaska (St. Clair 2006). These results also mirror the Holmes et al. study (2009) where WTP was larger 
for thinned public mitigation over own risk reduction, as well as qualitative analysis from Paveglio et al. 
(2016).
12 As mentioned before, our baseline WTP levels were based on lowest preference levels, not community status quo. 
Meaning that a WTP here for the status quo of no action (nomit) is a WTP over the least preferred option, which was 
clear cutting (clear).
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On the surface, WTP estimates for risk reduction variables tell an obvious story; respondents 
have larger WTP estimates for larger amounts of risk reduction. Even when comparing (ownrisk) to 
(neighrisk), the fact that respondents value their own risk reduction over their neighbor's risk reduction 
was presumed from a utility theory perspective a priori. However, these WTP estimates for risk reduction 
provide interesting results in the social context of altruism and free riding. Because the neighbor risk 
reduction variable was defined as risk reduction to the neighbors only, the WTP measures here are 
indicative of altruistic support of other neighborhood residents. Even in the face of common-sense 
realizations of shared neighborhood risk reduction, 8.37% (144 out of 1720) of all choice sets selected 
included an altruistic element. These choice sets were ones that had some preparation cost and resulted in 
no risk reduction to one's own property (ownrisk0). Out of these choice sets selected, there was a higher 
frequency for lower costs and higher neighbor risk reduction as seen in Table 3.11. Because there was no 
correlation between (cost) and (neighrisk), this suggests that this distribution is independent of the actual 
amount of (neighrisk), and these altruistic choices occur similarly for all (neighrisk) levels. This very 
much aligns with traditional utility theory, as well as warm glow studies done on contingent valuation 
surveys (Nunes & Schokkaert 2003)13. Traditional utility theory suggests that in order to combat the drop 
in individual utility from the cost, they would need to make up for it either from a relatively lower cost or 
more altruistic gain (neighbors risk increases) in order to maximize utility for a single choice. Free riding 
behavior was also observed in 20.6% (354 out of 1720) of choice set selections. These choice sets were 
ones that cost the respondent no money, but gave them some amount of risk reduction, either (ownrisk25) 
or (ownrisk50). While much of the utility gain is presumably due to the lack of cost, some of the 
preferences within the freeriding choices provide insight. Table 3.12 shows the frequency table for own 
risk and neighbors' risk. Correlation between the (ownrisk) and (neighrisk) variables within these 
responses indicates that these free riding choices tended to match risks (25% reduction for both or 50% 
reduction for both). In other words, it was less preferred for these free riding choices to include a situation 
where (ownrisk) was larger than (neighrisk) or vice versa. This is evidence of a restrained type of free 
riding.
13 Nunes and Schokkaert also assert that the inclusion of warm glow influence to WTP estimations is perfectly 
legitimate, as respondents may weigh the utility gained from different social states as they please.
3.3.2 Differences in Borough Respondents
Because the survey was sent out to two distinct Alaskan communities, WTP estimates can be 
calculated to compare how these homeowners value risk reduction differently. Respondents from the 
Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB, n=226) were analyzed separately from Kenai Peninsula Borough 
respondents (KPB, n=131). Apart from public land clearing, FNSB respondents had WTP estimates that 
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were either similar to, or larger than the respondents from the KPB (Table 3.10c). Specifically, moderate 
neighbor mitigation (neigh1-4) had a similar WTP to that of KPB respondents, but aggressive neighbor 
mitigation (neigh5+) WTP was much less in the KPB. Respondents in the KPB preferred (neigh0) over 
(neigh5+), indicating that robust community participation was not valued as highly as in the FNSB. 
However, when evaluating interaction terms, public land mitigation was valued higher in the KPB for 
both (thin) (FNSB $1290, KPB $1731) and (none) (FNSB$659, KPB$912). The variables (ownrisk) and 
(neighrisk) had a higher WTP across all levels in the FNSB (ownrisk25: $1133 ownrisk50: $1296 
neighrisk25: $667 neighrisk50: $689) over the KPB (ownrisk25: $854 ownrisk50: $945 neighRisk25: 
$453 neighRisk50: $544). This may suggest that while the ordinal value of variable levels stay the same, 
the overall perception of variables is seen as less desirable. KBP respondents valued moderate neighbor 
mitigation similarly to the FNSB respondents. However, these respondents valued aggressive fuel 
treatment much less, as seen by the negative WTP estimate. When comparing the two locations we see 
strong difference in preferences, with differences in one area being opposite those in another. While this 
may be a consequence of the grouping themselves (the total sample size is exactly equal to the sum of 
each locations sample sizes), the magnitude of these changes is still of interest. This combined with the 
fact that we see similar values for some attribute levels suggest that there are indeed significant 
differences in the way the two regions view wildfire risk reduction.
3.3.3 Self-Identification of Risk
Self-identification of wildfire risk changed the WTP for risk reduction. Those who self-identify as 
having a ‘High Risk14‘ where compared to those who self-identify as having a ‘Low Risk15‘. There is a 
general shift upwards for WTP for these ‘High-Risk' respondents (n=161) when compared to both the 
baseline group and the low risk group. Specifically, neighbors mitigating, and risk reduction (for both 
ownrisk and neighrisk) had significantly higher WTP values. These results show that the risk reduction 
from fuel removal is valued more in people who feel more threatened by wildfire than the baseline group. 
The one exception was the WTP for (nomit) where there was a reduction of almost 40%. This may be 
explained by the reduced amenity or inherent value in surrounding vegetative fuels by ‘High-risk' 
respondents, due to their own risk assessment. The ‘Low Risk' respondents (n=142) showed a similar 
general decrease for WTP measures. Risk reduction for these respondents were valued much less than the 
14 When asked ‘Which statement best describes your perception of the risk wildfire presents to your home?' these 
respondents answered either: ‘Wildfire will threaten my home in the next 10 years' or ‘Wildfire will probably 
threaten my home in the next 10 years'.
15 When asked ‘Which statement best describes your perception of the risk wildfire presents to your home?' these 
respondents answered either: ‘Wildfire will not threaten my home in the next 10 years' or ‘Wildfire will probably 
not threaten my home in the next 10 years'.
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baseline for neighbors mitigating, (ownrisk), as well as (neighrisk). Public land fuel reduction type was 
again an exception with a larger WTP for (thinned) and (none) when compared to the baseline.
3.3.4 Insurance
Responses to the question ‘How much do you pay per month for your homeowners' insurance?' 
were used to see how insurance premium affects the value of homeowner wildfire risk mitigation. The 
respondents were categorized by how much they paid in home insurance premiums. The groups were 
‘low insurance' (n=141), defined by paying home insurance premiums between $1 and $100, and ‘high 
insurance' (n=152), defined by paying home insurance premiums of more than $100 per month. There 
was also a small sample of respondents who did not have any homeowners insurance at all (n=31). WTP 
values for each group have been calculated and are again shown in Table 3.10a. The estimates for ‘Low 
Insurance' respondents are similar to the baseline estimates for neighbors mitigating, public land clearing, 
and neighbors risk reduction. WTP for (ownrisk) was smaller than the baseline. ‘High Insurance' 
respondents valued neighbor mitigation less than the baseline group, with a negative WTP for (neigh5+). 
For all other variables, WTP was larger than the baseline group, suggesting that even with a large amount 
of home protection via insurance, there is still significant WTP for risk reduction. It should be noted that 
insurance premiums are directly correlated with home value, so these WTP may reflect that, as well as 
non-insurance covered losses. Estimates for those who had no insurance are also listed, but due to the 
relatively small sample, these estimates may not be wholly reflective of that population.
3.3.5 Previous Experience with Wildfire
Lastly, respondents were shown a question that asked if any household members (including 
themselves) had direct experience with wildland fires16. Respondents were able to choose any or all of the 
three options, which included:
16 Question text: Which of the following situations regarding wildfire have you or someone in your 
household experienced?
• evacuated home because of wildland fire
• suffered property damage because of wildland fire
• witnessed wildland fire, observed smoke, or other effects of wildland fire
They were then grouped by those who selected at least one of these options (n=303), and those who did 
not select any (n=55). Those that had some direct experience had WTP estimates that were very similar to 
the baseline (Table 3.10c). Neighbor mitigation and public land mitigation variables all had very similar 
WTP estimates. (ownrisk) and (neighrisk) had increases, especially (ownrisk50). Seeing as this group had 
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a large sample proportional to the entire sample, it isn't surprising that the WTP estimates are similar. 
However, the small risk-based changes suggest that those who have had some direct experience with 
wildfires prefer risk reduction more than the baseline. Those without any experience had almost no 
preference for any neighbors mitigating their land, far lower than the baseline. For these respondents, 
(neigh5+) was preferred less than (neigh0). WTP for public land mitigation was also lower than the 
baseline. WTP values for (ownrisk) and (neighrisk) were significantly lower; about half of the baseline 
values. This may suggest that those without any direct experience with wildfire do not fully appreciate the 
risk due to wildfire. This theme is particularly suitable for future research, as the 2019 Shovel Creek fire 
(a WUI community in our sample area) required evacuation and should significantly increase the number 
of respondents with direct experience with wildfire.
3.4 Conclusion
The choice experiment, survey, and subsequent analysis all provide useful information to wildfire 
professionals across Alaska. There is evidence that certain homeowners would be incentivized to do 
mitigation activities by certain types of LMA activity. This would also include a reduction to the dangers 
of wildfire both to their own homes and well as their communities at large. Areas with the highest risk 
should be targeted with a specific risk analysis and LMA shaded fuel treatment plans to entice 
homeowners to mitigate on their own property. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the shaded treatments 
are needed due to the Alaskan permafrost, and quantitative evidence suggests the draw of amenity values 
on the shaded vegetation itself. However, this point needs to be addressed in order to most efficiently use 
resources to motivate homeowner mitigation. Also, the potential bias in the statistical estimation from the 
larger than normal education and income levels should be examined in further detail as well. Any of these 
issues can be addressed with future survey and choice experiment work. The foundation for addressing 
the needs and tastes of homeowners now exists and can be modified to answer an ever-growing list of 
other possible research questions. Wildfire professionals depend on sound research to inform their 
decision making. Other areas of the state could also be included in future surveys to increase the chances 
of a more even sample distribution. While this analysis provides a great foundation, Alaskan WUI 
communities will continue to require research to ensure they continue to thrive for decades to come.
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Table 3.1: Variables and variable levels used in choice experiment. The cost variable had five levels ranging from $0 to $2,000. The remaining 
variables had three levels and varied.
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Variable Variable Level 1 Variable Level 2 Variable Level 3 Variable Level 4 Variable Level 5
Cost of preparing your 
property
No action on your 
property $500 $1,000 $1,500 $2,000






1-4 neighbors preparing 
their property
5 or more neighbors 
preparing their property
Fuel treatments on 
neighboring public 
lands
No fuel treatment on 
nearby public lands
Nearby public lands have 
been thinned to create 
shaded fuel breaks
Nearby public lands have 
cleared fuel breaks where 
all trees have been 
removed
25% reduction in risk 50% reduction in risk over
Reduction in wildfire No reduction in over 10 years (from a 10 years (from a 20/1,000
risk to your property wildfire risk 20/1,000 chance to a chance to a 10/1,000
15/1,000 chance) chance)
25% reduction in risk 50% reduction in risk over
Reduction in wildfire No reduction in over 10 years (from a 10 years (from a 20/1,000
risk to your neighbors wildfire risk 20/1,000 chance to a chance to a 10/1,000
15/1,000 chance) chance)
Table 3.2: Age demographic data counts broken down by risk zone. Total counts for each zone and age group are also included.
Age High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
Younger than 20 years old 0 0 0 0
20-29 years old 3 1 3 7
30-39 years old 14 13 20 47
40-49 years old 12 27 23 62
50-59 years old 18 41 27 86
60-69 years old 31 37 27 95
70-79 years old 8 17 8 33
80-89 years old 1 2 1 4
90 years old or older 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 87 138 109 334
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Table 3.3: Education demographic data counts broken down by risk zone. Total counts for each zone and education group are also included. Also 
includes education levels by percentage in risk zone.
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What describes the 
highest education level 
you have completed?
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
did not finish High School 1 2 1 4
high school diploma 5 7 10 22
some college 14 25 24 63
associate degree 6 17 12 35
professional certification 4 5 9 18
bachelor's degree 26 46 35 107
graduate degree 22 25 16 63
doctorate/PhD degree 8 11 2 21
TOTAL 86 138 109 333
did not finish High School 1.16% 1.45% 0.92% 1.20%
high school diploma 5.81% 5.07% 9.17% 6.61%
some college 16.28% 18.12% 22.02% 18.92%
associate degree 6.98% 12.32% 11.01% 10.51%
professional certification 4.65% 3.62% 8.26% 5.41%
bachelor's degree 30.23% 33.33% 32.11% 32.13%
graduate degree 25.58% 18.12% 14.68% 18.92%
doctorate/PhD degree 9.30% 7.97% 1.83% 6.31%
Table 3.4: Income demographic data counts broken down by risk zone. Total counts for each zone and income group are 
also included.
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What is the total gross 
(before taxes) income 
for your household?
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
Less than $10,000 1 1 3 5
$10,000-$19,999 4 6 2 12
$20,000-$29,999 1 5 6 12
$30,000-$39,999 1 5 6 12
$40,000-$49,999 2 6 5 13
$50,000-$59,999 5 15 5 25
$60,000-$69,999 5 9 10 24
$70,000-$79,999 11 17 8 36
$80,000-$89,999 5 14 10 29
$90,000-$99,999 6 10 11 27
$100,000-$109,999 8 10 9 27
$110,000-$119,999 4 5 3 12
$120,000-$129,999 7 4 6 17
$130,000-$139,999 6 8 6 20
$140,000-$149,999 5 2 4 11
Greater than $150,000 12 18 10 40
TOTAL 83 135 104 322
Table 3.5: Responses to mitigation action taken broken down by risk zone. Total counts and percentages for each zone are also included.
Have wildfire 
mitigation activities 
been done on your 
home or property?
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
Yes 76 136 103 315
No 17 20 23 60
TOTAL: 93 156 126 375
% Yes 81.72% 87.18% 81.75% 84.00%
% No 18.28% 12.82% 18.25% 16.00%
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Table 3.6: Counts of specific risk mitigation actions taken by homeowners. Respondents could select as many actions as applied. Includes 
percentages of both those who had done some action (Selected) and from all respondents (Selected from Total Respondents).
67
Selected Selected Selected from Total Respondents
installed fire resistant siding 26 8.25% 6.93%
installed fire resistant roofing 120 38.10% 32.00%
installed screening over roof vents 44 13.97% 11.73%
installed a chimney spark arrester 49 15.56% 13.07%
widened the road leading to property 83 26.35% 22.13%
regularly cleared leaves from roof to reduce wildfire risk 122 38.73% 32.53%
regularly cleared leaves from roof for appearance purposes 70 22.22% 18.67%
regularly cleared first 10 feet of land around your home of light brush 193 61.27% 51.47%
regularly cleared first 50 feet of land around your home of light brush 152 48.25% 40.53%
regularly cleared first 100 feet of land around your home of light brush 59 18.73% 15.73%
regularly cleared leaves from yard for appearance purposes 129 40.95% 34.40%
pruned and trimmed trees and bushes 227 72.06% 60.53%
cut down dead or decaying trees 269 85.40% 71.73%
thinned dense areas of vegetation 187 59.37% 49.87%
mowed long grasses to reduce wildfire risk 158 50.16% 42.13%
mowed long grasses for appearance purposes 166 52.70% 44.27%
other: [Respondent Specify] 40 12.70% 10.67%
Table 3.7: Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group preparedness scores by region. Respondents were scored based on survey responses.




Table 3.8: Responses to defensible space question broken down by risk zone. Total counts for each zone and defensible 
space are also included. Also includes defensible space levels by percentage in risk zone.
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How close is the nearest fuel 
source to your home? Please 
include overgrown, dense, or 
unmaintained vegetation, as well 
as non-vegetative fuel sources 
such as firewood, fuel tanks, 
wood pellets, or other materials 
that could easily catch on fire.
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
within 0-10 ft. from home 24 54 28 106
within 10-30 ft. from home 42 59 42 143
within 30-100 ft. from home 27 38 51 116
further than 100 ft. from home 0 4 3 7
I don't know 0 2 2 4
TOTAL 93 157 126 376
% within 0-10 ft. from home 25.81% 34.39% 22.22% 28.19%
% within 10-30 ft. from home 45.16% 37.58% 33.33% 38.03%
% within 30-100 ft. from home 29.03% 24.20% 40.48% 30.85%
% further than 100 ft. from home 0.00% 2.55% 2.38% 1.86%
I don't know 0.00% 1.27% 1.59% 1.06%
Table 3.9: Responses to fuel treatment question broken down by risk zone. Total counts for each zone and fuel treatment 
type are also included. Also includes fuel treatment type by percentage in risk zone.
69
If public agencies were 
to perform hazardous 
fuel reduction around 
your neighborhood, 
which of the following 
methods would you 
prefer?
High Risk Very High Risk Extreme Risk All Risk Levels
cleared fuel break 7 17 14 38
mechanical thinning 74 114 89 277
no fuel treatments 7 13 11 31
TOTAL 88 144 114 346
cleared fuel break 7.95% 11.81% 12.28% 10.98%
mechanical thinning 84.09% 79.17% 78.07% 80.06%
no fuel treatments 7.95% 9.03% 9.65% 8.96%
Table 3.10a: WTP estimates for all respondents, subjective risk and insurance.
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All respondents High Risk LowRisk
High
Insurance LowInsurance
No neighbors preparing their 
property (Neigh0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
1-4 neighbors preparing their 
property
(Neigh1-4) $319.24 $775.97 $111.73 $232.54 $316.81
5 or more neighbors preparing their 
property
(Neigh5+) $14.78 $431.21 ($229.31) ($85.61) $43.69
Cleared (clear) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Thinned (thin) $1,456.56 $1,586.99 $1,542.45 $1,752.33 $1,438.50
None (nomit) $764.58 $474.99 $1,068.97 $852.10 $876.84
No reduction in wildfire risk 
(ownrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(ownrisk25) $1,050.02 $1,502.92 $814.63 $1,337.78 $814.43
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(ownrisk50) $1,179.36 $1,659.29 $903.39 $1,524.68 $901.60
No reduction in wildfire risk 
(neighrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(neighrisk25) $596.27 $1,037.47 $330.02 $637.17 $586.21
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(neighrisk50) $652.91 $1,186.82 $351.50 $729.48 $627.70
Table 3.10b: WTP estimates for all respondents and by changes in income.
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All respondents LessThan50k 50-100k MoreThan100k
No neighbors preparing their property 
(Neigh0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
1-4 neighbors preparing their property 
(Neigh1-4) $319.24 $726.40 $266.11 $362.90
5 or more neighbors preparing their 
property
(Neigh5+) $14.78 $501.51 ($59.84) $48.03
Cleared (clear) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Thinned (thin) $1,456.56 $1,574.27 $1,220.94 $1,738.22
None (nomit) $764.58 $839.10 $395.27 $1,010.83
No reduction in wildfire risk 
(ownrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years
(ownrisk25) $1,050.02 $899.67 $999.42 $1,377.32
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(ownrisk50) $1,179.36 $1,191.78 $1,207.60 $1,454.31
No reduction in wildfire risk 
(neighrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years
(neighrisk25) $596.27 $459.70 $677.67 $688.28
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(neighrisk50) $652.91 $794.19 $722.19 $758.19








No neighbors preparing their 
property (Neigh0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
1-4 neighbors preparing their 
property
(Neigh1-4) $319.24 $314.31 $315.23 $395.77 $8.49
5 or more neighbors preparing their 
property
(Neigh5+) $14.78 $85.88 ($162.43) $38.02 ($116.87)
Cleared (clear) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Thinned (thin) $1,456.56 $1,290.49 $1,730.82 $1,480.52 $1,222.02
None (nomit) $764.58 $659.18 $912.40 $771.92 $610.73
No reduction in wildfire risk 
(ownrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(ownrisk25) $1,050.02 $1,133.00 $853.81 $1,197.19 $454.43
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(ownrisk50) $1,179.36 $1,296.07 $944.74 $1,345.29 $518.35
No reduction in wildfire risk
(neighrisk0) $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
25% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(neighrisk25) $596.27 $667.09 $453.37 $677.90 $305.72
50% reduction in risk over 10 years 
(neighrisk50) $652.91 $689.04 $543.56 $716.20 $413.86
Table 3.11: Frequency table of altruistic choice sets where (ownrisk0) was selected. Frequencies were not correlated with changes in (neighrisk) 
category (χ2 p value = 0.395)
$500 $1000 $1500 $2000 Total
NeighO 8 (34.8%) 9 (26.1%) 2 (8.7%) 7 (30.4%) 23 (100%)
Neigh25 21 (41.2%) 16 (31.4%) 5 (9.8%) 9 (17.6%) 51 (100%)
Neigh50 33 (47.1%) 13 (18.6%) 11 (15.7%) 13 (18.6%) 70 (100%)
Total 62 35 18 29 144
Table 12: Frequency table of free-riding choice sets where (ownrisk) was not 0% and cost was $0. Frequencies were correlated with changes in 
(ownrisk) category (χ2 p value < 0.001)
73 Neigh0 Neigh25 Neigh50 Total
ownrisk25 35 (26.1%) 59 (44.0%) 40 (29.9%) 134 (100%)
ownrisk50 28 (12.7%) 81 (36.8%) 111 (50.5%) 220 (100%)
Total 63 140 151 354
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Fuel Treatments on the Suppression Costs of Large Alaskan Wildfires1
1 This chapter is currently being prepared externally for academic journal publication. Other authors on that 
manuscript include Joseph Little (University of Alaska Fairbanks), Stacy Drury (USDA - US Forest Service), Randi 
Jandt (University of Alaska Fairbanks) and Brock Lane (University of Alaska Fairbanks).
Abstract
The State of Alaska has unique challenges when stemming the social and economic costs of 
wildland fires. The total land mass and relatively low population densities of the state lead to large 
communities living in the Wildland Urban Interface. Homeowners in these areas are more susceptible 
to wildfire risk and face a larger threat to their homes and property. While wildfires that directly 
threaten these communities are abated with direct suppression efforts once discovered, the costs of 
suppression efforts can have staggering effects to state budgets. The costs of these large, open land 
wildfires were examined in a two stage least squared instrumental variable framework. Land 
management agencies often use fuel treatment locations to leverage suppression resources when 
available. They are anecdotally associated with cost efficiencies and expenditure savings by stopping 
wildfires sooner. By examining over 160 large Alaskan wildfires from 2007-2015, there is evidence 
that fuel treatments do not reduce wildfire suppression expenditures in the state in the aggregate. 
Costs were primarily driven by management option zones, the size of the fire, and several ecological 
factors. Even though fuel treatments weren't cost saving in general, understanding the suppression 
costs of Alaskan wildfires can potentially lead to better budgetary efficiencies by most appropriately 
allocating scarce funds to where it can do the most good.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Alaskan Perspective on Wildfire
Wildland fire has been steadily increasing in frequency and severity for decades (Kasischke & 
Turetsky 2006). While frequent wildfire years are often episodic, climate variables seem to be driving this 
increase in frequency and scale (Brown et al. 2004, Flannigan et al. 2009). Alaska is disproportionately 
affected by these climate dynamics and resulting wildfires due to its large land area. The spatial 
dimensions of the state required an interagency group of Alaska wildfire suppression agencies to create 
distinct suppression response zones (Alaska Department of Natural Resources: Division of Forestry 
2019a). These suppression management zones are defined by the potential risk to people and property 
from wildland fire. These zones guide wildfire managers to make decisions based on predetermined plans 
to address a wildfire ignition. The zones range from limited zones that warrant almost no suppression 
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response, to critical zones where a rapid and an extensive suppression response is imperative (Figure 
4.1).While large fires in limited and modified are often left to burn under supervision, any increase in 
frequency, severity, or proximity to population centers can sharply increase the need for suppression 
resources, as well as funds to cover the increased expenditures. Projections of wildfire costs in Alaska 
over the next century lie between one and two billion dollars, with an annual average of approximately 60 
million per year (Melvin et al. 2017). This not only presents a budgetary problem for the state, but a 
policy issue for state decision makers. Since sound policy should be born from quality scientific research, 
a thorough understanding of the costs of Alaskan wildfire and what drives them will be needed to mitigate 
potential fiscal impacts. Economic cost modeling will be crucial to examine the variability of 
expenditures used to suppress Alaskan wildland fires. This point is even more pertinent given the current 
budgetary predicament the state faces.
4.1.2 The Cost of Wildfire Suppression
The current wildfire suppression paradigm across the US is one that responds to large wildfire as 
a critical emergency when it threatens life and property. This is seen in the proportionality of suppression 
costs and number of nearby homes (Gude et al. 2013). In this context human lives are priceless, and we 
should expend every considerable resource to save people from wildfire. While this point is rarely 
debated, a myopic view may neglect the finite budgetary resources needed to respond with full force to 
threatening wildfire. This is not a new problem, as long-term upward trends have been seen in wildfire 
suppression cost data going back to the 1970's (Calkin et al. 2005, Gorte 2013). Cost efficiencies are of 
critical need in Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) locations, where there is the largest risk of loss from 
wildland fire. While the most obvious choice to model the costs of wildfire are ecological and climate 
variables, there are significant social variables that may influence suppression costs via incident decision 
making (Donovan et al. 2011, Thompson 2014). The non-social predictors of these rising suppression 
costs include increased biomass, drier and more dense forest understories, aggressive low intensity 
wildfire suppression, higher temperatures, drought, early snowmelt, and invasive pests. While there is 
little to be done in the local environment to impact global climate variables in the short term, reducing 
bulk biomass via fuel treatments has become a popular option for wildfire risk management. Fuel 
treatments represent a hybrid of an ecological and social variable, as it changes the physical 
characteristics of flammable fuels, as well as provide incident commanders an additional resource to 
potentially leverage when considering suppression tactics. Because wildfire managers can behave non­
optimality when ordering resources for fires (Wibbenmeyer et al. 2013), examining the role of fuel 
treatments in suppression expenditures is an examination of both physical and social factors. Fuel 
treatments have been shown to be a significant variable in resource ordering for wildfire managers in a 
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small sample expert elicitation framework (Little et al. 2018). If these trends were to exist in the larger 
population of wildfire managers and incident commanders, it could lead to more informed decision 
making and potentially suppression cost savings.
4.1.3 Wildfire Time Trends in Alaska
As previously mentioned, the frequency and severity of wildfires are increasing temporally on a 
national level. The trends are less clear for the State of Alaska. Statewide data was collected from the 
Alaska Department of Forestry for the aggregate number and area of wildfires burned both on state- 
controlled lands and statewide fires. Table 4.1 shows these values, while figures 4.2 and 4.3 give us a 
visual representation of the data. There were no statistically significant time trends found in acres burned 
per year in either DOF fires, or all statewide fires. We see the same lack of trend when breaking out the 
acreage by protection zone. The lack of a linear time trend suggests that the probabilistic nature of 
wildfire, mixed with the large number of low risk fires make these values driven by short-term episodic 
changes in climate and fuels. The seasonal changes for precipitation and lightning strikes are like those 
for wildfire seasonality, suggesting a non-linear trend in the short-term (Kasischke et al. 2002). The 
number of fires did have a significant time trend, but it was trending downwards in time. This downward 
tendency is counterintuitive, as we should either see the increases seen nationally, or no time trend. One 
potential explanation for this discrepancy has to do with the size of the state. There are two categories for 
wildfires causes as defined by the state: human and lightning. While more wildfires are started by human 
means, more acres are burned from wildfires ignited by lightning in Alaska (Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources 2019b). This could explain why there is no short-term linear time trend in the total 
acres burned, and why the total number of wildfires may be reducing over our timeframe. Presumably, 
any outreach and capacity building informational programs related to reducing wildfire ignition must 
target human caused wildfires. No informational campaigns can reduce the number of randomly 
probabilistic wildfires attacking the Alaskan landscape from lightning strikes. The total area of the state 
increases the probability that lightning will strike somewhere within its borders. This coupled with small 
population centers makes most of these fires no threat to human life or property. These fires then make up 
the bulk of the acres burned as they had little to no suppression resources used on them. Suppression cost 
trends for the analyzed wildfire data are examined in detail later in the text.
4.1.4 Are Fuel Treatments Effective?
Fuel treatments are a complex and divisive topic for wildfire suppression researchers and 
practitioners. The effectiveness and uses of fuel treatments have been examined extensively in the 
literature (Reinhardt et al. 2008, Amiro et al. 2001, Agee et al. 2000). Some research suggests that the 
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application of fuel treatments can help mitigate wildland fire costs (Wei et al. 2008, Stephens et al. 2012), 
while other research suggests the link between them is weak (Carey and Schumann 2003). Reinhardt et al. 
(2008) further notes that there is significant complexity when analyzing the effectiveness of fuel 
treatments. As a case study, the fuel treatments associated with the Funny River fire in the Kenai National 
Wildlife Refuge in 2014 were shown to significantly reduce the spread and, potentially, costs of the fire 
(Saperstein et al. 2014). However, the cost effectiveness of fuel treatments across the entire Alaskan 
landscape should be analyzed in the aggregate. If there are no identifiable cost savings from fuel 
treatments on a large scale, other tactics should be pursued to combat the predicted increase in wildfire 
frequency and severity. If certain fuel treatments in certain locations reduce suppression expenditures, 
then those treatments should be prioritized over less effective resource usage. The larger applicability of 
the Alaskan model may be informative for other sparsely populated areas bordering open wildlands.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 State of Alaska Wildfire Suppression Data
The primary expenditure and wildfire characteristics data for this analysis was obtained from two 
sources; The Alaska Fire Service - Alaska Interagency Coordination Center (Alaska Fire Service - Alaska 
Interagency Coordination Center 2019) for the general wildfire information and the Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources who provided suppression cost information (Direct Correspondence). This data was 
provided from accounting spreadsheets with line items expenditures for individual fires. This data was 
then coded for type and aggregated to get totals. Other data sources include the United States Geological 
Survey for topographical data, the Kenai Peninsula and Fairbanks North Star Boroughs for fuel treatment 
data, and the Western Regional Climate Center, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
for climate variables. This data was analyzed in ESRI ArcMap, and open-source GIS software (QGIS 
2019). Other variables were generated spatially and used the aforementioned software. Variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics for all data used in the analysis can be found in table 4.2. Our data set 
only includes large wildfires, which was self-defined as wildfires 50 acres and larger. The data also 
includes fires from all four protection zones.
The spatial data was compiled using shape files, as well as input by hand using coordinate 
projections. Using spatial coordinates provided in the fire data, ignition cites were plotted for each 
wildfire2. These points were then analyzed to apply variable values from other data sources. For example, 
interactions and distances to fuel treatments were calculated in ArcMap and QGIS by measuring the 
2 The use of ignition point analysis is supported by findings in Hand et al. (2016) that a more robust spatially 
descriptive model was not necessarily a better predictive model across their entire sample.
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distance from ignition points to the nearest fuel treatment. This process was also used with the climate 
data (precipitation, temperature, RH). The nearest weather station was determined for each wildfire, and 
weather data for the discovery month was pulled and added to the data set. In the event data was not 
available from the nearest weather station, the next closest weather station data was used until suitable 
data was found3. Raster data was used to determine the approximate elevation at each wildfire. An 
elevation raster was drawn, and elevation data was extracted at each fire point. The same process was 
used to estimate values for slope, aspect, and fuel type. Aspect data was used to create a binary variable 
for south facing, by attributing a 1 value to aspects between 90° and 270°, and a 0 for all others.
3 This process is inherently problematic in Alaska, as we cannot be guaranteed that multiple weather stations are 
available near all wildfires. The accuracy of the ignition site climate data is reduced the further away the data was 
collected. Incident reports (IC-209) were not complete enough to use as a reliable weather and climate data source.
4 The Urban Alaska Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all goods for all urban consumers was used to calculate 
inflationary changes, using 2015 as the base year.
The totalcost variable includes all suppression costs associated with the fire. It is the sum of the 
individual costs of overhead and hand crews, engine costs, aviation costs, equipment and supply costs, as 
well as any repayment to federal agencies suppressing wildfires on state lands. These costs include type 
1-4 hand crews, smokejumpers, incident command managers, air tanker drops, helitack runs, aviation 
fuel, retardant, engine time, dozers, pumps, as well as administrative costs and miscellaneous fees. 
Because these total expenditures are DOF-centric, much of the later analysis is based on looking only at 
DOF fires to ensure the maximum completeness of fire costs. The initial data set used for this analysis 
includes 280 wildland fires of greater than 50 acres across eight years (2007-2015) for which the State of 
Alaska staffed and incurred suppression costs. These wildfires include fires ignited in state (DOF) and 
federal (AFS/USFS) lands. Pre-negotiated agreements between the State of Alaska and Federal 
government agencies ensure for compensatory cross payments when their respective resources are used.
4.2.2 Data Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of our data set shows that 2010 and 2015 had the largest total state 
expenditures for wildfires ($40,216,231 and $49,265,893 respectively in 2015 dollars4) (Table 4.3). These 
years also had large areas burned on state lands. For fires in our data set, 2010 saw 770,033 acres burned 
and 885,661 in 2015. The only year that had more acreage burned in this time frame was in 2009, where 
over two million acres were burned (2,127,051). The probabilistic nature of wildfire, along with 
changing climatic variables can create very different fire conditions from year to year which introduces 
significant variability into a relatively small data set. As an example, 2015 had total expenditures almost 
25 times than of 2008. Figure 4.4 shows how the inflation adjusted total costs and acres burned change 
over time in our dataset wildfires. Figure 4.5 illustrates the same data, but from a per-acre perspective.
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We caution making long-term inferences about any trends because of the limited time frame over which 
the data are observed. Table 4.4 shows total acres and costs for all wildfires in the data set broken down 
by protection level. The cost per acre is significantly different between protection zones and is positively 
correlated to level of suppression response.
Other descriptive statistics of variable data are also shown in Table 4.2. Most of the wildfires in 
the data set fall into the limited and full protection zones. The dominant fuel type at the site of ignition 
was most often spruce, with mixed forests a distant second. The largest fire in terms of acreage was the 
Minto Flats fire in 2009, at over half a million acres. The most destructive in terms of structures 
threatened and burned was the Caribou hills fire in 2007. The most expensive wildfire in real 2015 dollars 
was the Hasting fire at over $22 million. Approximately 85% of these wildfires were caused by lightning, 
with percentage of human caused fires increasing with management zone. A frequency table of wildfire 
cause by protection zone can be seen in table 4.5 and shows significant correlation between the two (χ2 
test p value = 0.03).
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Endogeneity of Wildfire Costs
When modelling wildfire costs, explanatory variables may be affected by reverse causality 
(otherwise known as endogeneity). Wildfire costs are often modeled with total burn area, or total active 
days as explanatory variables. This presents a problem, since the burned area from a wildfire, and active 
fire days should be directly correlated to how many suppression resources are ordered (and thus affecting 
total cost). Estimating the effect of area burned and active days on total costs without acknowledging this 
endogeneity would result in biased parameter estimates. One common method to deal with this problem is 
the use of an instrumental variable (IV) via a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. There are 
examples of wildfire costs being modeled with this approach to resolve our endogeneity problem (Hand et 
al. 2016, Donovan et al. 2011, Gebert and Black 2012, Lankoande & Yoder 2006). Strictly speaking, the 
use of 2SLS does not remove bias, but IV estimators are asymptotically unbiased, making them consistent 
estimators. Our sample size of 163 DOF fires gives us enough sample size to benefit from this 
unbiasedness. The potential endogenous variables will be tested for explicitly to test for the bias in the 
dataset.
4.3.2 Instrumental Variables
While acres burned and active days are the most likely candidates for endogenous variables, 
instrumental variables also need to be identified to inform the 2SLS model. In order to defend the choice 
of instrumental variable, we need to assume both instrument exogeneity and relevance. We begin with our 
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Instrument exogeneity and relevance are met if and only if the following equations are true:
Cov = (z, u) = 0 [Instrument Exogeneity]
Cov = (z, x) ≠ 0 [Instrument Relevance]
where u is our random error of our structural cost equation, z is our instrumental variable, and x is an 
endogenous variable in X.
While seen as a statistical property, our instrument exogeneity condition is discussed from an 
economic or physical perspective, and not a statistical one. One potential instrumental variable unique to 
Alaskan wildfires is lightning. Once ignited, there should be no physical differences between wildfire that 
is caused by human or natural means ceteris paribus. Suppression resources are ordered under primary 
considerations of protecting human lives and property. Conversely, if we consider a simple regression 
(Eqn. 2) of x on our instrument lightning (z), we can test the statistical significance of the β1 on the 
estimated regression. Finding statistical significance at a certain acceptable level allows us to reject the 
null hypothesis of β1 = 0, and show that the instrument relevance assumption has been met. This is done 
as a test for weak instruments in our analysis. If we assume that acres is a suitable endogenous variable5, 
then there is also evidence of a correlative relationship between lightning strike caused wildfires and acres 
burned. In the US, wildfires caused by lightning burned up to nine times larger areas than those that were 
human causes from 2008-2012 (Ahrens 2013). This is also intuitive when viewed from the Alaskan 
landscape. The large area of the state increases the number of probabilistic lightning strikes and 
subsequent wildfires. These fires are often very far away from any population centers and are often only 
monitored instead of suppressed. This would then lead to a positive correlation between lightning caused 
wildfire and total wildfire acres burned. We can again see this explicitly by looking at table 4.5 which 
shows a highly significant correlation between these two variables (χ2 p value <0.001).
5 The rest of this section will assume that acres is the one and only endogenous variable used in our model. Wu- 
Hausman testing will determine the actual variables used as endogenous variables.
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generic structural equation (Eqn. 1), where Y is our dependent variable (costs), X is our matrix of 
explanatory variables, and u is our random error term.
Another potential choice for instrument is based on two of the previous studies looking at wildfire 
expenditures (Donovan et al. 2011, Gebert and Black 2012). These studies found that the year a wildfire 
took place could be a suitable instrumental variable. After controlling for climate and weather 
considerations, there should be no differences between real expenditures based merely on the passing of 
another year. Again, we can approach our instrument relevance via instrument strength tests to determine 
the best choices for instrumental variables.
4.3.3 Structural Model
A discussion of the model begins with a general economic function defining the variables 
responsible for changes in costs (Eqn. 3).
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Again, area (acres) should be thought of as an endogenous control, as area burned should be directly 
correlated to cost spent on the fire ceteris paribus. This economic equation leads to our reduced two-stage 
structural equation which estimates costs by first estimating exogenous variables. Using the natural log 
transformation allows us to discuss our parameter estimates in percentage terms. The first stage of our 
2SLS model begins with estimating the endogenous variable (Eqn. 4).
Based on the choice of binary predictors, our base scenario is a human caused, north facing wildfire in a 
limited suppression zone igniting shrub fuels in 2015 that is not 5km from a fuel treatment. This 
information is only useful when interpreting the parameter estimates of our binary control variables. Once 
parameters have been estimated, it uses the predicted values for lnacres into the second equation (note the 
use of the fitted value in equation 5). Remember, that any instrumental variables must not be included 
into this second stage, or we are violating our instrument endogeneity. Based on our previous arguments, 
we will test for lightning and our year dummies as instrumental variables. This would then lead to our 
structural equation (Eqn. 5).
Please note that all the computational analysis for this model was done using R studio and various 
community packages (R Core Team 2018, RStudio Team 2016). The AER package was used for IV- 
2SLS regression estimates and diagnostic tests (Kleiber and Zeileis 2008).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Endogenous and Instrumental Variables
Through the model specification process, testing was done to identify appropriate endogenous 
and instrumental variables. Using acres and days as candidates for our endogenous variables, and 
lightning and our year binary variables as candidates for instruments, we have nine possible combinations 
to test. Table 4.6 shows gives us the results three distinct tests: A weak instrument statistic, the Wu- 
Hausman endogeneity test, and the Sargan over-identification test. The weak instrument statistic is a test 
our instrument relevance condition. Specifically, it is an F-test of the instrument(s) in the first stage of our 
regression. While weak instruments may still have some non-zero correlation with the endogenous 
variable(s), it risks giving us asymptotically biased estimators. Rejecting the null hypothesis suggests that 
the correlation between endogenous and instrumental variable is large enough to avoid this issue. The 
Wu-Hausman tests the consistency between OLS and IV estimates. If the two estimates are consistent, it 
suggests that there is little need for the endogenous variable to be estimated in a first stage, and that is not 
a suitable choice for endogeneity based on the data. The null hypothesis in this case is that there is 
consistency between the two estimators. Finally, the Sargan test checks for over-identification of our 
instrumental variables. If we use more instruments than necessary, this test checks for correlation with the 
structural error (u). If correlation is found, it indicates that at least one of the instruments used is 
exogenous, and inappropriate to use.
The endogeneity of days is the most straightforward to discuss. Both on its own and when paired 
with acres, days passes the Wu-Hausman test and suggests that it is an appropriate choice for an 
endogenous variable. The endogeneity of acres is less clear. While it never passes the Wu-Hausman test 
by itself, it comes close when choosing the right IV (year). Strictly speaking, there is little statistical 
evidence that acres is endogenous with costs. However, the logical arguments for the endogeneity of 
acres still exist. There is also significant correlation between acres and days both intuitively and 
numerically (cor (acres, days) =0.52), suggesting that it could still perform well as an endogenous 
variable based on the results of days. When paired together, both acres and days were found to be 
endogenous. However, this is most likely due to the significance of days, and not their joint significance.
The instrumental variables candidates were lightning and year. Because we have identified 
appropriate endogenous variables, the next step will be to find a suitable instrument for those variables.
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The weak ID statistic shows us that while lightning was a strong instrument for acres6, it was a weak IV 
for days (as well as both acres and days). The year variable performed similarly, with one notable 
exception. When both acres and days are considered endogenous, year is a strong IV. When both 
lightning and year are used for IVs for acres and days, we no lose our strong IV for days. The Sargan test 
for over-identification found that when year or both year and lightning were used on acres, at least one of 
the year binaries, and/or lightning may be better suited as an exogenous control variable, and not an IV. 
We select two of the models based on the outcome of this preliminary testing:
6 This further supports the evidence found in Ahrens (2013) that lightning strikes are positively correlated with total 
area burned.
7 The baseline result for the lightning variable was a human caused fire.
Model 1: Endogenous variables acres and days; Instrumental variables year.
Model 2: Endogenous variable days; Instrumental variables year.
While our IV specification for using days alone was weak, it is important to remember that using both 
acres and days as endogenous variables passed the Wu-Hausman test despite acres, not because of its 
significance. We present the results of both models to identify any differences from our endogeneity and 
IV choices.
4.4.2 Selected Model Results
Parameter estimates for both models can be seen in table 4.6. Out of the 18 structural model 
variables, only 6 showed statistical significance in model 1. These included lnacres, full, critical, spruce, 
lnprecip and lnRH_1. The variable lnacres had a positive coefficient, indicating that as a wildfire's burned 
acreage increases by 1%, the cost of that fire increases by 0.67%. The binary variables for suppression 
management zones were mostly significant, with fires in both critical and full zones increasing costs 
significantly (243% and 217% respectively). Wildfires ignited in spruce forests were more likely to cost 
more than our base scenario by 139%. For every 1% increase in total monthly precipitation in the month 
the wildfire ignited, the costs were reduced by 0.59%. Similarly, with relative humidity, when average RH 
of the month before the ignition month increases by 1%, wildfire costs are reduced by 2.19%. Model 2 has 
similar outcomes, with the biggest change being the addition of lightning as significant, suggesting that 
wildfires ignited by humans were 102% more expensive that lightning caused fires7. This is an intuitive 
result and supported by the correlation between lightning caused wildfire and protection zone. It should 
also be noted that lightning was almost significant at the 10% level in model 1, with a p value of 0.105. 
Many of other control variables were not significant, but more importantly, neither was FT_5KM. The fuel 
84
treatment binary variable did not show any statistical significance in either model, suggesting that having a 
fuel treatment within 5 km of the wildfire ignition point did not affect total costs.
Variance Inflation Factor analysis was done to examine the levels of multicollinearity and can be 
seen in table 4.7. While multicollinearity does not make estimators biased in a technical sense, it does 
inflate standard errors (and reduces p values), so an examination of excessive correlation may shed light 
on borderline significant parameter estimates. Model 1 had the least amount of problematic 
multicollinearity. Relative humidity and its 1-month time lag both high levels of multicollinearity, 
presumably from each other (cov (RH, RH_1) =0.849). These values are just above the threshold of 5, 
indicating that both estimates may be incorrectly reported as significant. This is particularly pertinent for 
RH_1, as it is significant just above the 5% level. The variable lndays had a very high VIF, again 
indicating that any significance may be unreliable. Luckily (or not), this variable's estimates had no 
statistical significance, so any reduction in standard error did not change our interpretation of that 
variable. Model 2 saw the exact same issues as Model 1, with the inclusion of lnacres as a new 
problematic variable. In this case, we did find statistical significance at the 1% level (p value: 0.004). The 
strength of significance here may assuage fears of multicollinearity causing concern, but it is still a real 
possibility given the magnitude of the VIF. One last thing to consider while there may be 
multicollinearity issues present in these models, there was not a large VIF for our FT variable. Because 
most of the other variables of note are control variables, their issues with multicollinearity does not affect 
our estimates for the primary variable of interest.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Model Estimators
Large wildfires burning in Alaska have a wide variety of characteristics, each affecting the 
suppression costs associated with them. While over 160 Alaskan wildfires were analyzed, only a small 
fraction had a chance to have any interaction with fuel treatments. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between fuel treatments and total wildfire suppression costs that was identified. While this 
should not suggest the complete ineffectiveness of fuel treatments, it does indicate that suppression costs 
of the fires in the dataset were not influenced by fuel treatments in the aggregate. This may be because 
some Alaskan fuel treatments could not stop advancing wildfire on their own (Little et al. 2018), or 
because there is such a small chance for a fire to interact with a fuel treatment. This makes studies of fuel 
treatments inherently problematic for many WUI communities in the US. The case study of the funny 
river fire posited that the fuel treatments bordering the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge saved homes, 
expense, and left “hundreds of other structures” unscathed (Sapperstein et al 2014). There is also the
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probabilistic component of this analysis, in that given the size of the state, there may not be enough 
wildfires that had any interactions with fuel treatments to accurately assess their cost effectiveness. It is 
also possible that wildfire has not attacked many cost-effective fuel treatments that have been constructed 
to protect vulnerable communities.
The suppression management areas provide interesting insight into how these wildfire costs 
change. While there was no significant difference between expenditures in limited and modified fires, 
there were very significant differences for the other two. The magnitude of these changes even reflected 
the level of response, as wildfires in critical zones were the most expensive and those in full zones were 
less expensive. These results are also supported by the initial wildfire statistics showing a positive 
correlation between cost per acre and suppression zone (Table 4.4). This has an intuitive explanation, as 
these zones are defined by the imperativeness of a suppression response. Because of the overriding 
paradigm of protecting life and property, this result gives overall reliability to the model, and these 
variables as controls. The fuel type at ignition site also is intuitive, as mixed and spruce forests are more 
likely to burn hotter and faster than shrubs or tundra due to the significant difference in fuels loads. 
Precipitation and our lagged RH variable are also in line with intuition, as more moisture, both during the 
fire and moisture of the fuel load both reduced costs significantly. Even with the significance, and 
intuitive nature of the RH predictor, we cannot ignore our VIF findings that potentially invalidate this 
relationship. Finally, human caused fires are more expensive than those caused by lightning. This can be 
explained intuitively by the fact that human caused fires are more likely to start in areas closer to 
population centers, increasing the suppression response in both time and effort. This can also be seen in 
the positive correlation between lightning caused fired in limited and modified zones (0.308 and 0.047 
respectively) and the negative correlation in full and critical zones (-0.119 and -0.635 respectively)8. The 
predictors are almost identical for model 2, so this discussion applied to that model as well. Control 
variables that were not significant included terrain characteristics (slope, aspect and elevation), 
temperature, and total structures threatened. While the control variables we chose had legitimate 
ecological reasoning behind them, they weren't significant indicators in our dataset. Like our fuel 
treatment argument, there is no reason to believe that these aren't good control variables, just that they 
weren't econometrically shown to be significant in this instance.
8 The VIF for lightning was less than two, which suggests these correlations do not affect our parameter estimates.
4.5.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
The use of endogeneity and instrumental variables was critical to the estimation in our models. 
While the results were described when a model was specified, a more critical look is required. From one 
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perspective, both acres and days showed significance as endogenous predictors. When paired together 
they had statistically significant testing results. There is also a strong economic argument for their 
endogeneity, as increased suppression resources should decrease both acres burned and total active days. 
However, one could also make the argument that neither were very clear and strong candidates for 
endogeneity. Not only did acres show no evidence for endogeneity on its own, it was only included in our 
model when paired with days. Even days wasn't immune to this, as it didn't always pass the Wu- 
Hausman test when checking multiple instruments. We see a similar pattern when looking at the two 
instruments used in the analysis. Lightning was a poor instrument when used by itself, except when paired 
with acres as the endogenous variable. Year was much stronger but was still seen as a weak instrument 
when paired with the best choice for endogenous variable, days. For both the endogenous and IV 
conversation, there is little that stands out as a clear result. However, the best choices individually for 
these variables, are days and year, with the best producing model using both endogenous variables paired 
with years. Ultimately, the predictors are similar for each model, but the validity of the instrumental and 
endogenous variables will be useful for future studies.
4.6 Conclusion
Wildfires in the state of Alaska are unique in many ways. They can often burn huge areas of land 
while keeping risk to human life and property very low. But there are also large WUI portions of the state 
that require investigation into the best way to provide support to their communities. Fuel treatments are 
often discussed as a means to provide that protection, but this needs to be done in the lens of social 
effectiveness, which includes cost-effectiveness. The overall effectiveness of fuel treatments was not 
empirically found in large wildfires in Alaska from 2007-2015 in this analysis. The main drivers of costs 
were found in the suppression management zones, with other weather and ecological control 
considerations. Instrumental variables were identified, along with useful endogeneity of model variables. 
There are still some unanswered questions when it comes to explaining expenditure data of large Alaskan 
wildfires. Further research into this topic may help illuminate just how effective fuel treatments can be in 
a social context. For example, wildfires in critical suppression zones were the most expensive ceteris 
paribus. Examining the overall effectiveness of fuel treatments in critical zones may provide better insight 
that a statewide aggregate model.
It is important to note that in the context of the analysis presented is econometric in nature. It 
reflects the current landscape of Alaskan fuel treatments as they were between 2007 and 2015. There is a 
myriad of reasons why a fuel treatment may not be leveraged to ultimately reduce costs that could range 
from incident commander decisions, to wind direction or other stochastic justifications. This discussion 
also doesn't include suppression efficiencies from these fuel treatments themselves. Suppose a wildfire 
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would cost the same with or without a nearby fuel treatment, but with one present, it reduced the risk to 
spreading closer to populated communities. In this scenario, fuel treatments would still be categorized as 
providing a social benefit even without a budgetary one. For Alaskan wildfire risk mitigation, the use of 
fuel treatments is popular. Continued and ongoing research will need to keep pace with the changing 
landscape to continue to provide protection for all Alaskan residents.
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Table 4.1: Wildfire counts and acres burned from 1990-2018 by protection zone. Time trend statistical 
significance (β time) is also shown. Maximum values for this time series are in bold. Data on acres burned 
by protection area were not available before 2003. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Year
Statewide
# Acres Critical Full Modified
State Lands Only (DOF)
Limited # Acres
1990 802 3,189,427 - - - - 460 981,291
1991 760 1,750,653 493 174,277
1992 474 135,360 332 36,667
1993 869 713,117 535 120,223
1994 643 265,722 446 90,827
1995 421 43,946 327 16,585
1996 724 599,267 565 81,737
1997 773 2,026,899 612 1,058,911
1998 412 120,752 338 63,708
1999 486 1,005,248 333 145,806
2000 369 756,296 260 35,197
2001 321 98,720 297 87,127
2002 543 2,183,363 399 802,517
2003 476 602,718 - - - - 357 11,481
2004 696 6,523,182 135,826 723,281 220,835 5,038,956 392 2,102,067
2005 624 4,663,880 709 253,796 831,330 3,578,045 346 720,806
2006 307 266,268 1,102 607 148,629 115,929 249 170,942
2007 509 649,411 85 73,552 7,904 567,870 284 135,976
2008 367 103,649 395 3,647 2,327 97,280 254 8,529
2009 527 2,951,593 1,426 50,498 213,902 2,685,766 330 1,142,995
2010 688 1,125,419 18,492 296,109 140,903 669,914 330 268,818
2011 515 293,018 2,038 80,332 6,886 203,761 356 145,839
2012 416 286,888 2,832 26,035 14,737 243,283 269 26,598
2013 613 1,316,289 2,277 29,715 56,100 1,225,196 452 589,123
2014 393 233,530 588 63,459 16,980 152,502 304 201,998
2015 768 5,111,453 26,087 963,484 763,034 3,358,847 479 1,045,564
2016 572 500,949 1,210 49,370 67,638 382,162 375 104,627
2017 362 653,148 161 57,041 2,002 593,843 177 81,247
2018 362 411,177 178 32,107 41,741 337,134 203 46,036
TOTAL 15,792 38,581,343 193,406 2,703,033 2,534,948 19,250,488 10,554 10,497,518
β (time) -7.00* 5,481 -3,077 -8,384 -14,328 -148,232 -6.25*** 899
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Figure 4.1: Map of Alaskan suppression response zones based on the Alaska Interagency Fire 
Management Plan 2010 (Alaska Department of Natural Resources: Division of Forestry 2019a).
Figure 4.2: Total number and acres of all wildfires in the State of Alaska by year from 1990-2018. Acres 
in on the primary (left) axis and number of wildfires in on the secondary (right) axis.
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Figure 4.3: Total number and acres of Alaska Department of Forestry wildfires by year from 1990-2018. 
Acres in on the primary (left) axis and number of wildfires in on the secondary (right) axis.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics and definitions for data set variables. Sum/Count column sums data for continuous variables or counts data for 
binary variables. Statistics for year binary variables are presented in a different table. Mean and StdDev columns gives average values and 
standard deviation values for dataset variables respectively. Max and Min columns give us the largest and smallest values of data set variables.
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Variable Definition Sum/Count Mean StdDev Max Min
totalcost total state expenditures $213,943,538 $764,084 $2,176,119 $22,814,501 $84
acres total acres burned 4,626,895 16,525 48,249 517,078 50
days total active days wildfire burned 14,256 51 40 204 0
str_threat Structures threatened by wildfire 4,732 17 154 1,603 0
modified binary variable indicating fire started in a modified 
suppression management zone 29 0 0 1 0
full binary variable indicating fire started in a full 
suppression management zone 117 0 0 1 0
critical binary variable indicating fire started in a critical 
suppression management zone 18 0 0 1 0
limited binary variable indicating fire started in a modified 
limited management zone 116 0 0 1 0
slope slope at ignition point 526 2 2 14 0
facesouth binary variable indicating an aspect between 90° and 270° 133 0 1 1 0
elev elevation at ignition point 75,103 268 218 999 1
tundra binary variable indicating that the primary fuel type 
region at the ignition point was arctic tundra 42 0 0 1 0
mixed binary variable indicating that the primary fuel type 
region at the ignition point was mixed forest 75 0 0 1 0
spruce binary variable indicating that the primary fuel type 
region at the ignition point was spruce forest 126 0 0 1 0
shrub binary variable indicating that the primary fuel type 
region at the ignition point was shrub 37 0 0 1 0
FT_5km binary variable indicating a fuel treatment was within 5 
km of wildfire ignition point 9 0 0 1 0
temp average monthly temperature at ignition point 15,506 55 7 67 15
precip sum of monthly precipitation at ignition point 415 1 1 11 0
RH relative humidity at ignition point 17,067 61 12 89 1
RH_1 relative humidity of previous month at ignition point 16,226 58 13 97 0
lightning binary variable that indicates the fire cause being 
lightning 231 1 0 1 0
y20XX Binary variable for each year in the dataset (2007-2015) - - - - -
Table 4.3: Yearly breakdown of costs and acres burned in total and per fire in the dataset. Costs are 
inflation adjusted to 2015 dollars. Included wildfires are those larger than 50 acres.
year fires real costs ($2015) acres cost/fire acres/fire
2007 44 $14,937,615 438,053 $339,491.25 9,956
2008 25 $1,995,310 62,549 $79,812.40 2,502
2009 53 $30,718,600 2,127,051 $579,596.23 40,133
2010 72 $40,216,231 770,033 $558,558.77 10,695
2011 9 $37,273,694 82,751 $4,141,521.53 9,195
2012 9 $10,487,538 28,316 $1,165,281.96 3,146
2013 16 $16,714,011 31,345 $1,044,625.68 1,959
2014 3 $12,334,646 201,138 $4,111,548.76 67,046
2015 49 $49,265,893 885,661 $1,005,426.38 18,075
Table 4.4: Wildfire acreage and cost statistics by protection zone. Includes cost per acre values by 
protection zone.
Total Acres Total Cost Total Cost/Acre
Limited 2,781,013 $19,802,186 $7.12
modified 259,662 $11,335,447 $43.65
full 1,491,595 $153,412,784 $102.85
critical 94,626 $29,393,121 $310.63
Table 4.5: Frequency table of wildfire cause by protection zone. Significant correlation was found 
between the two variables (χ2 test p value = 0.0001). Included percentage of cause by protection zone.
Lightning Human Total
limited 111 (95.7%) 5 (4.3%) 116 (100%)
modified 23 (79.3%) 6 (20.7%) 29 (100%)
full 87 (75.7%) 28 (24.3%) 115 (100%)
critical 13 (72.2%) 5 (27.8%) 18 (100%)
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Figure 4.4: Total real costs and acres burned per year for wildfires used in the dataset. Costs are inflation 
adjusted to 2015 dollars. Real costs are plotted on the primary (left) axis and acres on the secondary 
(right) axis.
Figure 4.5: Total real costs per fire and acres burned per fire per year for wildfires used in the dataset. 
Costs are inflation adjusted to 2015 dollars. Real costs per acre are plotted on the primary (left) axis and 
acres per fire on the secondary (right) axis.
97
Table 4.6: Parameter estimates for two specified models. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. R2 values are not reported as they do not have 
















































Wald Test (P value) 0.000*** 0.000***
Weak ID (days) 0.092* 0.276




Table 4.7: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all variables in both models. VIF values larger than 5 are 






























The work discussed in this dissertation covers a range of topics relating to wildfire. The unique 
perspectives of Alaskan Homeowners were investigated, and significant results for their preferences were 
identified. These results can potentially be applied to similar communities that have comparable 
challenges, such as having significant WUI communities in northern latitudes with plenty of open 
wildlands. Homeowner incentives are important to understand, as sound policy and budgetary decisions 
can be informed by these incentives. Understanding the economic tradeoffs associated with fuel 
treatments can better maximize the use of pre-suppression funds. The aggregate efficiencies of previous 
decisions should be assessed to proficiently allocate future public spending.
Chapter 2 and 3 offer significant insight into the preferences and behavior of homeowners. 
Chapter 2 showed no discernable differences between residents of the two different boroughs in the way 
they responded to the survey portion. While residents of the Fairbanks North Star Borough (FNSB) had 
larger defensible spaces, there were no other differences of note between the issues these homeowners 
faced. Both boroughs shared problems with misidentification of objective wildfire risk and a lack of 
proper compliance with best wildfire protection practices. These results support the idea that this is 
endemic of WUI locations in general, as these results match other studies (Brenkert-Smith et al. 2013). 
There were large numbers of homeowners doing some mitigation actions on their property, but less were 
in general compliance with Firewise. Besides the misidentification of wildfire risk, amenity and privacy 
values were of particular importance. This was seen in both the preference for thinned fuel breaks, as well 
as directly stated by survey respondents (with the loss of these values as a disincentive to reduce fuels). 
Free riding wasn't seen in these responses, as homeowners tended to take similar actions as their 
neighbors did.
Chapter 3 provided quantitative willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for those who completed the 
choice experiment. In general, respondents favored a moderate number of neighbors mitigating their 
property. This is due to the perception that reducing fuels to the maximum extent in a portion of the 
community would negatively change the amenity values around the homeowner's property. Thinned fuel 
treatments had a large WTP associated with it. No treatment on public lands was generally more preferred 
than clear cutting to create fuel breaks. This implies that homeowners would rather transfer the cost onto 
themselves to avoid the risk reduction from clear cutting on public lands. There was evidence of altruistic 
and free riding choices being made, but free riding choices still tended to at least match neighbors' risk as 
well, indicating restrained free riding. In general, those who felt they were in a higher risk area had higher 
101
WTP estimates across all variables. The same is said for those that had some direct experience with 
wildfire.
The results of this work have important policy and institutional implications. The aggregate cost 
effectiveness of fuel treatments has been called into question. From an individual level, there is a strong 
preference for the most expensive type of fuel treatments. This is also combined with a WTP that may be 
able to offset these costs. While none currently exists, a payment mechanism can be created to move this 
cost on to those who most directly benefit. Future studies can be developed, such as a referendum style 
choice experiment to determine the preferences for these mechanisms in different Alaskan communities. 
The lack of objective wildfire risk information is contrasted with its clear benefits and should offer 
motivation for capacity building programs like Firewise, especially given that they are shown to increase 
homeowner participation (Sturtevant & McCaffrey 2006). The gap in subjective and objective risk seen 
should encourage these programs to increase effort, especially in those communities where this 
discrepancy is the largest. Fuel treatments should not be thought of as unfeasible. The success of the 
Funny River fuel treatment had measurable impacts on the reduction in spending, property damage, and 
vulnerability of those affected homeowners. However, there should be critical thought put into the 
placement and use of fuel treatments moving forward. A thorough analysis of what made the funny river 
fuel treatment (and other effective fuel treatments) so effective should be done to influence future 
spending decisions. If the effectiveness is driven by the more probabilistic elements of wildfire (wind 
speed, relative humidity, temperature, etc.) then it may be more difficult to depend on the effectiveness of 
any fuel treatments.
Future studies, especially with follow up surveys would be valuable to study both the longitudinal 
differences in Alaskan WUI resident attitudes, as well as to study the effects of individual fire seasons and 
evacuations. By having these groups respond to the survey again, we can test for any statistically 
significant changes in responses and observe how these external changes affect homeowner preferences 
and behavior. As with a survey of this length, there remains a source of information that has yet to be 
analyzed. The work here focuses on the major themes currently faced by wildfire practitioners and 
researchers. Some of these themes could be analyzed even further by including other survey information. 
For example, the insurance portion of both chapter 2 and 3 could be more informed by including home 
values. While this data was not immediately available, the survey asked questions on property and home 
sizes in terms of both square footage and acreage. These metrics can act as proxy variables for home 
value to better inform WTP and correlations between insurance and subjective homeowner wildfire risk. 
Subjective homeowner feelings of protection and safety is another possible area of investigation. 
Questions were asked about fire protection agents, and how far away they are. Objective measurements to 
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the nearest fire department and the specific fire department agency (federal, state, municipal, volunteer or 
none) can be made when comparing respondents to their spatial data. This could be another “Objective vs 
Subjective” type of analysis to investigate the levels of informed decision-making being done by 
homeowners. Questions were also asked about previous participation in programs designed to increase 
wildfire knowledge and information sharing. This could create another category to see how WTP changes 
for those with and without experience in these programs. In this data set, there was a low number of 
respondents who had any experience with these programs (N = 94) with most of them having no Firewise 
or state stewardship program experience. This could then be turned into a program effectiveness analysis, 
examining how these respondents answered subjective questions as a measurement of community wildfire 
knowledge.
Potential extensions of this research are also numerous. A more complete picture of the economic 
impact from wildfires is much larger in scope than the work presented here. Private and state 
considerations were the focus of the econometric analysis, but federal expenditures were explicitly 
excluded in the cost models. There are other significant direct, indirect, and induced impacts from 
wildfire that were not examined, such as changes to tourism, employment, recreational values, and local 
spending. The impacts from wildfire smoke and pollution are also associated with increased respiratory 
related disease and increased medical costs. Fine particulate matter pollution (PM2.5 and PM10) already 
impacts the Fairbanks North Star Borough with “spare the air” days and air quality index advisories to 
stay indoors. Lastly, it is also worth investigating the economic impacts that wildfires have on 
atmospheric and climate-based variables, such as lighting and precipitation.
There is a critical need to continue investigating Alaskan wildfire from an economic, budgetary, 
and policy perspective. Wildfires will continue to increase in severity and frequency and will impact 
generations to come. Understanding homeowner preferences to fuel treatments, neighborhood 
involvement and how their WTP reflect these changes is critical to future policy decisions. This work acts 
as a primer for continued discussion and research into these topics. The implications of this work reach 
beyond Alaskan borders, as many of these results have been seen elsewhere in the US. This essential 
work is currently threatened by economic and political forces affecting research and institutional budgets 
across the state. Wildfire researchers and practitioners must continue their endeavors to keep studying the 
vulnerable populations of the state. The stakes are high, so we must continue to investigate these 
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